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Abstract
Quantum entanglement is one of the most remarkable aspects of quantum
physics. If two particles are in a entangled state, then, even if the particles
are physically separated by a great distance, they behave in some repects as
a single entity. Entanglement is a key resource for quantum information pro-
cessing and spatially separated entangled pairs of particles have been used
for numerous purposes such as teleportation, superdense coding and cryp-
tography based on Bell’s theorem.
Just as two distant particles could be entangled, it is also possible to
entangle three or more separated particles. A well-known application of
multipartite entanglement is in testing nonlocality from different directions.
Recently, it has also been used for many multi-party computation and com-
munication tasks and multi-party cryptography. One of the major issues in
dealing with multi-partite entangled states is of purification. Distilling pure
maximally entangled state in this case may not be as simple as that of bipar-
tite case. But if it is possible to create multi-partite entangled states from
the bipartite ones then we can first distill pure maximal bipartite states and
can then prepare the multi-partite ones.
To this end, we consider the problem of creating maximally entangled
multi-partite states out of Bell pairs distributed in a communication network
from a physical as well as from a combinatorial perspective. We investigate
the minimal combinatorics of Bell pairs distribution required for this purpose
and discuss how this combinatorics gives rise to resource minimization for
practical implementations. We present two protocols for this purpose. The
first protocol enables to prepare a GHZ state using two Bell pairs shared
amongst the three users with help of two cbits of communication and local
operations. The protocol involes all the three users dynamically and thus
can find applications in cryptographic tasks. Second protocol entails the use
of O(n) cbits of communication and local operations to prepare an n par-
tite maximally entangled state in a distributed network of bell pairs along
a spanning tree of EPR graph of the n users. We show that this spanning
tree structure is the minimal combinatorial requirement. We also charac-
terize the minimal combinatorics of agents in the creation of pure maximal
multi-partite entanglement amongst the set N of n agents in a network using
apriori multi-partite entanglement states amongst subsets of N .
Another major and interesting issue is of quantifying multi-partite en-
tangled states. Multi-partite entangled states, unlike the bipartite ones, lack
convenient mathematical properties like Schmidt decompostion and therefore
it becomes difficult to characterize them. Some approches, essentially using
the generalization of Schmidt decomposition, have been taken in this direc-
tion ; however a general formulation in this case is still an outstanding un-
resolved problem. State transformations under local operations and classical
communication (LOCC) are very important while quantifying entanglement
because LOCC can at the best increase classical correlations and therefore a
good measure of entanglement is not supposed to increase under LOCC. All
the current approaches to study the state transformation under LOCC are
based on entropic criterion. We present an entirely different approach based
on nice combinatorial properties of graphs and set systems. We introduce
a technique called bicolored merging and obtain several results about such
transformations. We demostrate a partial ordering of multi-partite states
and various classes of incomparable multi-partite states. We utilize these
results to establish the impossibility of doing selective teleportation in a case
where the apriori entanglement is in the form of a GHZ state. We also dis-
cuss the minimum number of copies of a state required to prepare another
state by LOCC and present bounds on this number in terms of quantum dis-
tance between the two states. The ideas developed in this work continues the
combinatorial setting mentioned above and can been extended to incorpo-
rate other new kinds of multi-partite states. Moreover, the idea of bicolored
merging may also be appropriate to some other areas of information sciences.
Key distribution is a fundamental problem in secure communication and
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols for key distribution between two
parties on the account of quantum uncertainty and no-cloning principles
was realized two decades ago, however the more rigorous and comprehen-
sive proofs of this task, taking into consideration source, device and channel
noise as well as an arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper, have been only recently
studied by various authors. We consider QKD between two parties extended
to that between n trustful parties, that is, how the n parties may share
an identical secret key among themselves. We propose a protocol for this
purpose and prove its unconditional security. The protocol is simple in the
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sense that the proof of its security is established on the basis of the already
proven security of the bipartite case. Our protocol works in two broad steps.
In the first step, the n-partite problem is reduced to a two-party problem.
In the second step, the Lo-Chau protocol or Modified Lo-Chau protocol is
invoked to prove the unconditional security of sharing nearly perfect EPR
pairs between two parties. The first step essentially utilizes the spanning tree
combinatorics mentioned above.
An other interesting aspect of multi-party cryptography is to split infor-
mation through secret sharing and splitting the quantum information has
also been studied recently. In conventional quantum secret sharing (QSS)
schemes, it is often implicitly assumed that all share-holders carry quantum
information. This requirement can be relaxed, whereby some share holders
may carry only classical information and no quantum information. Such a
hybrid (classical-quantum) QSS that combines classical and quantum secret
sharing brings a significant improvement to the implementation of QSS, in
as much as quantum information is much more fragile than classical infor-
mation. The practical implementation of a quantum secret sharing scheme
is facilitated if it can be compressed to an equivalent scheme with fewer
quantum information carrying players, the reduction compensated by play-
ers who carry only classical information. Conversely, a given quantum secret
sharing scheme may be inflated by adding only classical information carrying
players. To this end, we explore some generalizations of such quantum se-
cret sharing (QSS). We study an extended QSS scheme, wherein some shares
may be retained by the share dealer, that enables the construction of access
structures with disjoint authorized sets, similar to classical secret sharing.
We also propose a hybrid (classical-quantum) generalization of the threshold
scheme. Our schemes are based on two interesting ideas. First one is the idea
of qubit encryption and encryption key as the relevant classical information.
However, in principle any classical data whose suppression leads to maximal
ignorance of the secret is also good. The second, while more restricted, is in-
teresting because it is not directly based on quantum erasure correction, but
on information dilution via homogenization, in contrast to current proposals
of QSS.
QKD involves sharing a random key amongst trustworthy parties where
as QSS splits quantum information amongst untrusted parties. We discuss
situations where some kind of mutual trust may be present between sets of
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parties while parties being individually mistrustful. This way we take a step
towards combining the essential features of QKD and QSS. We discuss two
problems where this idea is applicable. The first problem is of secure key
distribution between two trustful groups where the invidual group members
may be mistrustful. The two groups retrieve the secure key string, only if
all members should cooperate with one another in each group. In the second
case, we consider several such groups. Members of the same group trust each
other whereas members from different groups do not and the problem is to
establish a common shared random key amongst the n untrustful parties. We
present protocols for these cases and discuss the proof of their unconditional
security. Finally, we conclude brifly with some open research directions based
on our research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Stepping in to the Quantum World
The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible!
— Albert Einstein
I am not happy with all the analyses that go with just classical theory,
because Nature isn’t classical, dammit, and if you want to make a simulation
of Nature, you’d better make it quantum mechanical, and by golly it’s a won-
derful problem! — Richard Feynman
This wonderful observation of Feynman in the early 1980’s [Fey82, Fey96]
that no classical computer could simulate quantum mechanical systems with-
out incurring exponential slowdown but it might be possible provided the
simulator was itself quantum mechanical, stemmed the widespread interest
in the field of quantum computation and quantum information. There are
three very important features of quantum mechanics which provides us the
way to exploit such powerful processors:
1. A quantum particle can exist simultaneously in many incompatible
states.
2. We can operate on a quantum particle while it is in a superimposed
state and affect all the states at once.
3. One quantum system can influence another far away quantum system
instantaneously
3
This is the kind of parallelism inherent in quantum world and combined
with the present day information processing gives birth to exciting develop-
ments: Quantum computation, quantum error correction, quantum entan-
glement and teleportation and quantum cryptography. Quantum computers
are able to solve some problems intractable to conventional computation
(problems like prime factorization and discrete logarithm). Quantum error
correcting techniques enable us to do quantum computation and commu-
nication in present of noise. Quantum cryptosystems provide guaranteed
secure communication using no-cloning theorem and uncertainty principle
and quantum teleportation provides the way to do quantum communication
in absence of a quantum channel using prior quantum entanglement and
classical communication.
1.2 Quantum Mechanical Model of Compu-
tation
In any model of information processing there are at least three requirements:
1. The representation of the information
2. The operations to be applied on the information
3. The way for extracting result after the operation
In the quantum mechanical model of information processing the informa-
tion is mathematically represented by a ray in a Hilbert Space, operations
are the unitary operators in the space and result is the measurement of an
observable described by a hermitian operator in the space.
1.2.1 Representing Quantum Information: Qubits and
Quantum Registers
The first postulate of quantum mechanics sets up the arena in which quantum
mechanics takes place. The arena is our familiar friend from linear algebra,
Hilbert space.
Postulate 1: Associated to any isolated physical system is a Hilbert space
known as the state space of the system. The system is completely described
4
by its state vector, which is a unit (ray) in the systems’s state space.
The simplest non-trivial Hilbert space is of dimension two and a state
vector in the state space of dimension two is called a qubit (stands for a
quantum bit). Suppose |0〉 and |1〉 form an orthonormal basis for that state
space. Then an arbitrary state vector in the state space can be written
|ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉,
where a and b are complex numbers. The condition that |ψ〉 be a unit
(ray), < ψ|ψ >= 1, is therefore equivalent to |a|2 + |b|2 = 1.
Nature is not so simple and a qubit is not sufficient to deal with its com-
plexity. We must be interested in composite system made of two (or more)
distinct physical systems and we must also have a mathematical way of play-
ing around with them. In analogy to the classical terminology, a composite
quantum system i.e. a set of qubits is called a quantum register. The follow-
ing postulate describes how the state space of a composite system (quantum
register)is built up from the state spaces of the component systems (the
qubits).
Postulate 2: The state space of a composite physical system is the tensor
product of the state spaces of the component physical systems. Moreover, if
we have systems numbered 1 through n, and a number i is prepared in the
state |ψi〉, then the joint state of the total system is |ψ1〉
⊗ |ψ2〉⊗ . . .⊗ |ψn〉,
where
⊗
denotes tensor product.
1.2.2 Unitary Evolution: Quantum Gates
Time evolution of a quantum state is unitary; it is generated by a self-
adjoint (Hermitian) operator, called the Hamiltonian of the system. In the
Schrodinger picture of dynamics, the vector describing the system moves in
time as governed by the Schrodinger equantion
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 = −iH|ψ(t)〉
where H is the Hamiltonian. We may express this equation, to first order
in the infinitesimal quantity dt, as
|ψ(t+ dt)〉 = (1− iHdt)|ψ(t)〉.
Clearly, the operator U(dt) ≡ 1− iHdt is unitary. Thus the time evolu-
tion over a finite interval is unitary given by
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|ψ(t)〉 = U(t)|ψ(0)〉.
Postulate 3: The evolution of a closed quantum system is described by
a unitary transformation. That is, the state |ψ〉 of the system at time t1
is related to the state |ψ′〉 of the system at time t2 by a unitary operator U
which depends only on the times t1 and t2,
|ψ′〉 = U |ψ〉.
Now that a quantum system evolves according to a unitary operator which
is always invertible, quantum gates must be reversible. Infact, quantum gates
are nothing but these unitary operations. Following are some commonly used
one qubit and two qubit gates in terms of their unitary operations represented
by matrices in the computational basis.
Pauli’s Gates (Operators) :
X ≡
( |0〉 |1〉|0〉 0 1
|1〉 1 0
)
Y ≡
( |0〉 |1〉|0〉 0 −i
|1〉 i 0
)
Z ≡
( |0〉 |1〉|0〉 1 0
|1〉 0 −1
)
Hadamard Gate :
H ≡
( |0〉 |1〉|0〉 1/√2 1/√2
|1〉 1/√2 −1/√2
)
Controlled- NOT (CNOT) Gate: A two qubit gate


|00〉 |01〉 |10〉 |11〉
|00〉 1 0 0 0
|01〉 0 1 0 0
|10〉 0 0 0 1
|11〉 0 0 1 0


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The Postulate 3 requires that the system being described be closed. That
is, it is not interactive in any way with other systems. In reality, of course,
all systems (except the Universe as a whole) interact at least somewhat with
the other systems. Nevertheless, there are interesting systems which can be
described by unitary evolution to some good approximation. Furthermore,
at least in principle every open system can be described as part of a larger
closed system (the Universe) which is undergoing unitary evolution.
1.2.3 Quantum Measurement: Observables
An observable is a property of a physical system that in principle can be
measured. In quantum mechanics, an observable is a hermitian operator.
We also know that a hermitian operator in a Hilbert space H has a spectral
decomposition- it’s eigenstates form a complete orthonormal basis in H. We
can express a hermitian operetor A as
A =
∑
n
anPn .
Here each an is an eigen value of A, and Pn is the corresponding orthog-
onal projection onto the space of eigenvectors with eigenvalues an. ( If an is
non-degenerate, then Pn = |n〉〈n|; it is the projection onto the corresponding
eigenvector.) The Pn satisfy
PnPm = δn,mPn
P†
n
= Pn.
Postulate 4: In quantum mechanics, the numerical outcome of a measure-
ment of the observable A is an eigenvalue of A; right after the measurement,
the quantum state is an eigenstate of A with the measured eigenvalue. If the
quantum state just prior to the measurement is |ψ〉, then the outcome an is
obtained with the probability
Prob(an) = ‖ Pn|ψ〉 ‖2 = 〈ψ|Pn|ψ〉 ;
If the outcome attained is an, then the (normalized) quantum state be-
comes
Pn|ψ〉√
(〈ψ|Pn|ψ〉)
.
(Note that if the measurement is immediately repeated, then according
to this rule the same outcome is attained again, with probability one.)
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1.3 Quantum Entanglement
Quantum mechanics builds systems out of subsystems in a remarkable, holis-
tic way. The states of the subsystems do not determine the state of the
system. Schrodinger, commenting on the EPR paper[EPR35] in 1935, the
year it appeared, coined the term entanglement for this aspects of quantum
mechanics.
Consider a system consisting of two subsystems. Quantum mechanics as-
sociates to each subsystem a Hilbert space. LetHA andHB denote these two
Hilbert spaces; let |iA〉 (where i=1,2,...) represent a complete orthonormal
basis for HA, and |iB〉 (where i=1,2,...) represent a complete orthonormal
basis for HB. Quantum mechanics asociates to the system-i.e. the two sub-
system taken together-the Hilbert spaceHA
⊗
HB, namely the Hilbert space
spanned by the states |iA〉
⊗ |iB〉. In the following we will drop the tensor
product symbol
⊗
and write |iA〉
⊗ |iB〉 as |iA〉|iB〉.
Any linear combinations of the basis states |iA〉|iB〉 is a state of the sys-
tem, any state |ψ〉AB of the system can be written as
|ψ〉AB =
∑
i,j ci,j|iA〉|iB〉,
where the ci,j are complex coefficients, we take |ψ〉AB to be normalized,
hence
∑
i,j |ci,j|2 = 1.
A special case of the above state is a direct product state in which |ψ〉AB
factors into (a tensor product of) a normalized state |ψ(A)〉A =
∑
i c
(A)
i |i〉A in
HA and a normalized state |ψ(B)〉B =
∑
j c
(B)
j |j〉B in HB.
|ψ〉AB = |ψ(A)〉A|ψ(B)〉B = (
∑
i c
(A)
i |i〉A)(
∑
j c
(B)
j |j〉B)
Not every state in HA
⊗
HB is a product state. Take, for example, the
state (|1〉A|1〉B + |2〉A|2〉B)/
√
2; if we try to write it as a direct product of
states of HA and HB, we will find that we can not.
If |ψ〉AB is not a product state, we say that it is entangled.
Thus when two quantum subsystems are entangled, we may have a com-
plete knowledge of the composite system as a whole but not of the individual
subsystems. Technically speaking, the system as a whole may be in a pure
state while individual subsystems still being in mixed states.
Entanglement is a key resource for quantum information processing and
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spatially separated entangled pairs of particles have been used for numerous
purposes like teleportation [BBCJPW93], superdense coding [BW92] and
cryptography based on Bell’s Theorem [Ekert91], to name a few. We shall see
some novel and interesting characterization and applications of entanglement
in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Characterizing the
Combinatorics of Distributed
EPR Pairs for Multi-partite
Entanglement
2.1 Introduction
Quantum entanglement is one of the most remarkable aspects of quantum
physics. Two particles in an entangled state behave in some respects as a
single entity even if the particles are physically separated by a great dis-
tance. The entangled particles exhibit what physicists call non-local effects.
Such non-local effects were alluded to in the famous 1935 paper by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen [EPR35] and were later referred to as spooky actions
at a distance by Einstein. In 1964, Bell [Bell64] formalized the notion of
two-particle non-locality in terms of correlations amongst probabilities in a
scenario where measurements are performed on each particle. He showed that
the results of the measurements that occur quantum physically can be corre-
lated in a way that cannot occur classically unless the type of measurement
selected to be performed on one particle affects the result of the measurement
performed on the other particle. The two particles thus correlated maximally
are called EPR pairs or Bell pairs. Non-local effects, however, without be-
ing supplemented by additional quantum or classical communication, do not
convey any signal and therefore the question of faster than light communi-
10
cation does not arise.
Entanglement is a key resource for quantum information processing and
spatially separated entangled pairs of particles have been used for numerous
purposes like teleportation [BBCJPW93], superdense coding [BW92] and
cryptography based on Bell’s Theorem [Ekert91], to name a few. An EPR
channel (a bipartite maximally entangled distributed pair of entangled par-
ticles) can be used in conjunction with a classical communication channel
to send an unknown quantum state of a particle to a distant particle. The
original unknown quantum state is destroyed in the process and reproduced
at the other end. The process does not copy the original state; it transports
a state and thus does not violate the quantum no-cloning theorem [WZ82].
This process is called teleportation and was proposed by Bennett et al. in
their seminal work [BBCJPW93]. In teleporation, a quantum communica-
tion channel is simulated using a classical channel and an EPR channel. A
classical channel can also be simulated using a quantum channel and an
EPR channel using superdense coding as proposed by Bennett and Wiesner
[BW92]. Two cbits (classical bits) are compressed in to a qubit and sent
through an EPR channel to the distant party, who then recovers the cbits
by local operations.
The use of EPR pairs for cryptography was first proposed by Ekert in
1991 [Ekert91]. He proposed a protocol based on generalized Bell’s theorem
for quantum key distribution between two parties. The two parties share
an EPR pair in advance. They do a computational basis measurement on
their respective qubits and the mesurement result is then used as the one bit
shared key. While the measurement result is maximally uncertain, the cor-
relation between their results is deterministic. Based on similar principles,
a multiparty quantum key distribution protocol using EPR pairs in a dis-
tributed network and its proof of unconditional security has been proposed
by Singh and Srikanth [SS03A] (Chapter 4). Apart from these applications,
entanglement has been used in several other applications such as cheating bit
commitment [LC97], broadcasting of entanglement [BVPKH97] and testing
Bell’s inequalities [Bell64, CHSH69, GP92].
Just as two distant particles could be entangled forming an EPR pair, it
is also possible to entangle three or more separated particles. One example
(called GHZ state) is due to Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger [GHZ89]; here
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three particles are entangled. A well-known manifestation of multipartite en-
tanglement is in testing nonlocality from different directions [GHZ89, Mer90,
HM95, DP97]. Recently, it has also been used for many multi-party compu-
tation and communication tasks [BCD01, BDHT99, BBT03, Grov97, PSK03]
and multi-party cryptography [HBB99, SG01, BVK98]. Buhrman, Cleve and
van Dam [BCD01], make use of three-party entanglement and demostrate the
existence of a function whose computation requires strictly lesser classical
communication complexity compared to the scenario where no entanglement
is used. Brassard et al. in [BBT03], show that prior multipartite entan-
glement can be used by n agents to solve a multi-party distributed problem,
whereas no classical deterministic protocol succeeds in solving the same prob-
lem with probability away from half by a fraction that is larger than an in-
verse exponential in the number of agents. Buhrman et al. [BDHT99] solves
an n-party problem which shows a separation of n versus Θ(n logn) bits
between quantum and classical communication complexity. For one round,
three-party problem this article also proved a difference of (n + 1) versus
((3/2)n + 1) bits between communication with and without intial entangle-
ment. In [PSK03], Pal et al. present a fair and unbiased leader election
protocol using maximal multi-partite entanglement.
Quantum teleportation strikingly underlines the peculiar features of the
quantum world. All the properties of the quantum state being transfered are
retained during this process. So it is natural to ask whether one qubit of
an entangled state can be teleported while retaining its entanglement with
the other qubit. The answer is, not surprisingly, in the affirmative. This is
called entanglement swapping. Yurke and Stoler [YS92] and Zukowski et al
[ZZHE93] have shown that through entanglement swapping one can entan-
gle particles that do not even share any common past. This idea has been
generalized to the tripartite case by Zukowski et al. in [ZZW95] and later to
the multipartite case by Zeilinger et al. [ZHWZ97] and Bose et al. [BVK98].
Zeilinger et al. presented a general scheme and realizable procedures for gen-
erating GHZ states out of two pairs of entangled particles from independent
emissions. They also proposed a scheme for observing four-particle GHZ
state and their scheme can directly be generalized to more particles. To cre-
ate a maximally entangled state of (n+m−1) particles from two groups, one
of n maximally entangled particles and the other of m maximally entangled
particles, it is enough to perform a controlled operation between a particle
from the first group and a particle from the second group and then a mea-
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surement of the target particle. We observe that if particles are distributed
in a network then a single cbit of communication is required for broadcasting
the mesurement result to construct the desired (n+m−1) maximally entan-
gled state using local operations. In [BVK98], Bose et al. have generalized
the entangled swapping scheme of Zukowski et al. in a different way. In
their scheme, the basic ingredient is a projection onto a maximally entangled
state of N particles. Each of the N users needs to share a Bell pair with a
central exchange. The central exchange then projects the N qubits with it
on to an N particle maximally enatngled basis, thus leaving the N users in
an N partite maximally entangled state. However, we note that in order to
get a desired state, the measurement result obtained by the central exchange
must be broadcast so that the end users can appropriatly apply requisite
local operations. This involves N cbits of communication.
In this chapter, we consider the problem of creating pure maximally en-
tangled multi-partite states out of Bell pairs distributed in a communication
network from a physical as well as a combinatorial perspective. We investi-
gate and characterize the minimal combinatorics of the distribution of Bell
pairs and show how this combinatorics gives rise to resource minimization
in long-distance quantum communication. We present protocols for creating
maximal multi-partite entanglement. The first protocol (see Theorem 1) en-
ables us to prepare a GHZ state using two Bell pairs shared amongst the three
agents with the help of two cbits of communication and local operations with
the additional feature that this protocol involves all the three agents dynam-
ically. Such a protocol with local dynamic involvement in creating entangle-
ment may find applications in cryptographic tasks. The second protocol (see
Theorem 4) entails the use of O(n) cbits of communication and local opera-
tions to prepare a pure n-partite maximally entangled state in a distributed
network of Bell pairs; the requirement here is that the pairs of nodes sharing
EPR pairs must form a connected graph. We show that a spanning tree struc-
ture (see Theorem 3) is the minimal combinatorial requirement for creating
multi-partite entanglement. We also characterize the minimal combinatorics
of agents in the creation of pure maximal multi-partite entanglement amongst
the set N of n agents in a network using apriori multi-partite entanglement
states amongst subsets of N . This is done by generalizing the EPR graph
representation to an entangled hypergraph and the requirement here is that
the entangled hypergraph representing the entanglement structure must be
connected.
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Figure 2.2.1: A shares an EPR pair with each of B and C.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present our proto-
col I to prepare a GHZ state from two Bell pairs involving all the three agents
dynamically and compare our protocol in the light of existing schemes. Sec-
tion 2.3 is devoted to characterizing the spanning tree combinatorics of Bell
pairs for preparing a pure n-partite maximally entangled state. We develop
our protocol II for this purpose. In Section 2.4 we generalize the results
of Section 2.3 to the setting where subsets of agents in the network share
apriori pure multi-partite maximally entangled states. Finally in Section 2.5
we compare our scheme of Section 2.3 with the multipartite entanglement
swapping scheme of Bose et al. [BVK98], observe the similarity between
Helly-type theorems and the combinatorics developed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4
and conclude with a few remarks on open research directions.
2.2 Preparing a GHZ State from Two EPR
Pairs Shared amongst Three Agents
In this section we consider the preparation of a GHZ state from two EPR
pairs shared amongst three agents in a distributed network. We establish the
following theorem.
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Figure 2.2.2: Entangling qubits a3 with the EPR pair between A and B.
Theorem 1 If any two pairs of the three agents A (Alice), B (Bob) and
C (Charlie) share EPR pairs (say the state (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2) then we can
prepare a GHZ state (|000〉 + |111〉)/√2 amongst them with two bits of
classical communication, while involving all the three agents dynamically.
Proof: The proof follows from the Protocol I.
The Protocol I: Without loss of generality let us assume that the sharing
arrangement is as in Figure 2.2.1. A shares an EPR pair with B and another
EPR pair with C but B and C do not share an EPR pair. This means that
we have the states (|0a10b〉 + |1a11b〉)/√2 and (|0a20c〉 + |1a21c〉)/√2 where
subscripts a1 and a2 denote the first and second qubits with A and subscripts
b and c denote qubits with B and C, respectively.
Our aim is to prepare (|0a10b0c〉+|1a11b1c〉)/√2 or (|0a20b0c〉+|1a21b1c〉)/√2.
We need three steps to do so.
Step 1: A prepares a third qubit in the state |0〉. We denote this state as
|0a3〉 where the subscript a3 indicates that this is the third qubit of A.
Step 2: A prepares the state (|0a10b0a3〉+ |1a11b1a3〉)/√2 using the circuit in
Figure 2.2.2.
Step 3: A sends her third qubit to C with the help of the EPR channel
(|0a20c〉+ |1a21c〉)/√2. A straight forward way to do this is through telepor-
tation. This method however, does not involve both of B and C dynamically.
By a party being dynamic we mean that the party is involved in applying
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the local operations for the completion of the transfer of the state of third
qubit to create the desired GHZ state.
We use our new and novel teleportation circuit as shown in Figure 2.2.3
where both B and C are dynamic. The circuit works as follows. A has all her
three qubits with her and can do any operation she wants to be performed
on them. Initially the five qubits are jointly in the state |φ1〉. A first applies
a controlled NOT gate on her second qubit controlling it from her third
qubit changing |φ1〉 to |φ2〉. Then she measures her second qubit yielding
measurement result M2 and bringing the joint state to |φ3〉. She then applies
a Hadamard gate on her third qubit and the joint state becomes |φ4〉. A
measurement on the third qubit is then done by her yielding the result M1
and bringing the joint state to |φ5〉. She then applies a NOT (Pauli’s X
operator) on her first qubit, if M2 is 1. Now she sends the measurement
results M2 to B and M1 to C. B applies an X gate on his qubit if he gets 1
and C applies a Z gate (Pauli’s Z operator) if he gets 1. The order in which
B and C apply their operations does not matter. The final state is |φ7〉. The
circuit indeed produces the GHZ state between A, B and C as can be seen
from the detailed mathematical explanation of the circuit given below. It
can be noted that this protocol requires two cbits of communication.
The above circuit can be explained as follows:
|φ1〉 = (|0a10b0a3〉+ |1a11b1a3〉)(|0a20c〉+ |1a21c〉)/2,
|φ2〉 = [|0a10b0a3〉(|0a20c〉+ |1a21c〉) + |1a11b1a3〉(|1a20c〉+ |0a21c〉)]/2.
Case 1: M2 = 0
|φ3〉 = (|0a10b0a30a20c〉+ |1a11b1a30a21c〉)/√2
= (|0a10b0a30c〉+ |1a11b1a31c〉)|0a2〉/√2,
|φ4〉 = (|0a10b0a30c〉+ |0a10b1a30c〉+ |1a11b0a31c〉 − |1a11b1a31c〉)|0a2〉/2
= [(|0a10b0c〉+ |1a11b1c〉)|0a3〉+ (|0a10b0c〉 − |1a11b1c〉)|1a3〉]|0a2〉/2.
When M1 = 0,
|φ5〉 = (|0a10b0c〉+ |1a11b1c〉)|0a3〉|0a2〉/√2,
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Figure 2.2.3: Circuit for creating a GHZ state from two EPR pairs with
dynamic involment of both B and C.
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|φ6〉 = (|0a10b0c〉+ |1a11b1c〉)|0a3〉|0a2〉/√2,
|φ7〉 = (|0a10b0c〉+ |1a11b1c〉)|0a3〉|0a2〉/√2.
When M1 = 1,
|φ5〉 = (|0a10b0c〉 − |1a11b1c〉)|1a3〉|0a2〉/√2,
|φ6〉 = (|0a10b0c〉 − |1a11b1c〉)|1a3〉|0a2〉/√2,
|φ7〉 = (|0a10b0c〉+ |1a11b1c〉)|1a3〉|0a2〉/√2.
Case 2: M2 = 1
|φ3〉 = (|0a10b0a31a21c〉+ |1a11b1a31a20c〉)/√2
= (|0a10b0a31c〉+ |1a11b1a30c〉)|1a2〉/√2,
|φ4〉 = (|0a10b0a31c〉+ |0a10b1a31c〉+ |1a11b0a30c〉 − |1a11b1a30c〉)|1a2〉/2
= [(|0a10b1c〉+ |1a11b0c〉)|0a3〉+ (|0a10b1c〉 − |1a11b0c〉)|1a3〉]|1a2〉/2.
When M1 = 0,
|φ5〉 = (|0a10b1c〉+ |1a11b0c〉)|0a3〉|1a2〉/√2,
|φ6〉 = (|1a11b1c〉+ |0a10b0c〉)|0a3〉|1a2〉/√2,
|φ7〉 = (|1a11b1c〉+ |0a10b0c〉)|0a3〉|1a2〉/√2.
When M1 = 1,
|φ5〉 = (|0a10b1c〉 − |1a11b0c〉)|1a3〉|1a2〉/√2,
|φ6〉 = (|1a11b1c〉 − |0a10b0c〉)|1a3〉|1a2〉/√2,
|φ7〉 = (−|1a11b1c〉 − |0a10b0c〉)|1a3〉|1a2〉/√2
= (|1a11b1c〉+ |0a10b0c〉)|1a3〉|1a2〉/√2.
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The roles of B and C are symmetrical. Nevertheless, there is a condition
on what operations they should perform when they get a single cbit from A.
B performs an X and C performs a Z operation, as required. We set a cyclic
ordering A → B → C → A. Let A be the one sharing EPR pairs with the
other two; A is the first one in the ordering. The second one is B, and he
must perform an X operation when he gets a single cbit from A. The third
one is C, and he must perform a Z operation on his qubit when he gets a
single cbit from A. If B is the one sharing EPR pairs with the other two
then C applies an X on his qubit after getting a cbit from B and, A applies
Z on her qubit after getting a cbit from B and so on.
As we mentioned in the introduction, methods for creating a GHZ state
from Bell pairs have also been discussed by Zukowski et al. [ZZW95] and
Zeilinger et al. [ZHWZ97]. First one uses three Bell pairs for this purpose,
therefore our protocol seems better than theirs in the sense that it uses only
two Bell pairs. The later, however, uses only two Bell pairs and only one
cbit of communication and seems to be better than our method at first sight.
However, the most interesting fact and the motivation for developing our
protocol is the dynamic involvement of bothB and C which was lacking in the
above methods. It might me highly desired in many multi-party interactive
quantum protocols and multi-party cryptograhy (viz. secret sharing) that
both B and C take part actively, say for fairness. By fairness we mean that
every party has an equal chance for participating and effecting the protocol
in probabilistic sense. It should be interesting to implement this in practical
situation.
2.3 Preparing a Pure n-partite Maximally En-
tangled State from EPR Pairs Shared amongst
n Agents
Definition 1 EPR graph: Suppose there are n agents. We denote them as
A1, A2, ..., An. Construct an undirected graph G = (V,E) as follows:
V = {Ai : i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n},
E = {{Ai, Aj} : Ai and Aj, share an EPR pair,1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; i 6= j}.
We call the graph G = (V,E), thus formed, the EPR graph of the n agents.
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Figure 2.3.4: Entangling a new qubit in agent i.
Our definition should not be confused with the entangled graph proposed
by Plesch and Buzek [PB03A, PB03B]. In entangled graph edges represent
any kind of entanglement and not neccessarily maximal entanglement and
therefore there is no one to one correspondence between graphs and states.
EPR graph is unique up to different EPR pairs. Moreover, we are not con-
cerned with classical correlations which are also represented by different kind
of edges in entangled graphs. In an EPR graph, two vertices are connected
by an edge if and only if they share an EPR pair.
Definition 2 Spanning EPR Tree: We call an EPR Graph G = (V,E) as
spanning EPR tree when the undirected graph G = (V,E) is a spanning tree
[CLR90].
We are now ready to develop protocol-II to create the n-partite maximally
entangled state (|000...0〉 + |111...1〉)/√2 along a spanning EPR tree. The
protocol uses only O(n) cbits of communication and local operations. We do
not use any qubit communication after the distribution of EPR pairs to form
a spanning EPR tree.
Protocol II: Let G = (V,E) be the spanning EPR tree. Since G is a spanning
EPR tree, it must have a vertex say T = At which has degree one (the number
of edges incident on a vertex is called its degree). Note that vertices of G are
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denoted Ai, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let S = As be the unique vertex connected
to T by an edge in G and L be the set of all vertices of G having degree
one. The vertex T and its only neighbor S are vertices we start with. We
eventually prepare the n-partite maximally entangled state using the three
steps summarized below. In the first step, one cbit (say 1) is broadcasted by
S to signal other (n− 1) parties that the protocol for the preparation of the
n-partite entangled state is about to commence. The second step creates the
GHZ state between S = As, T = At and another neighbour R = Ar of S.
The third step is the main inductive step where multi-partite entanglement
states are created in a systematic manner over the spanning EPR tree. At
the end of step 3, when the n-partite entangled state is ready, one cbit of
broadcating from all the (k− 1) elements of L \ {T} (terminal or degree one
vertices of G) is expected. The (k−1)th such cbit indicates that the protocol
is over and that maximally entangled state is ready. The details are stated
below.
Step 1: S broadcast one classical bit to signal the other (n− 1) agents that
the preparation of an n-partite entangled state is going to be started and they
must not use their EPR pairs for a qubit teleportation amongst themselves.
In other words, they must save their EPR pairs in order to use them for the
preparation of the n-partite entangled state.
Step 2: Clearly S must be connected to a vertex R (say Ar) other than
T by an edge in G, otherwise G will not be a spanning EPR tree. A
GHZ state among S, T and Ar is created. The GHZ state can be pre-
pared either by using usual teleportation circuit, the symmetric circuit of
protocol I or by the Zeilinger et al. scheme. Thus using the EPR pairs
(|0s,t0t,s〉+ |1s,t1t,s〉)/√2 and (|0s,r0r,s〉+ |1s,r1r,s〉)/√2, we prepare the GHZ
state (|0s,t0t,s0r,s〉 + |1s,t1t,s1r,s〉)/√2. Here the double subscript i, j denotes
that in preparing the given state, EPR pairs among the agents Ai and Aj
have been used. Here, As = S,Ar = R and At = T .
Step 3: Suppose we are currently at vertex Ai and we have already prepared
the m-partite maximally entangled state, say
(|0i1,j10i2,j20i3,j3...0im,jm〉+ |1i1,j11i2,j21i3,j3...1im,jm〉)/√2,
where i1 = s, j1 = t, i2 = t, j2 = s, i3 = r, j3 = s and i = ir for some
1 ≤ r ≤ m.
The vertex Ai starts as follows. As soon as he gets two cbits from one
of his neighbors, he completes the operations required for the success of
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teleportation and starts processing as follows. If Ai ∈ L then Ai broadcast
a single cbit. Otherwise, (when Ai /∈ L) let Ak1, Ak2, ..., Akp be the vertices
connected to Ai by an edge in G such that k1, k2,..., kp are not in the already
entangled set with vertex indices {i1, i2, i3, ..., im}. Ai takes an extra qubit
and prepares this qubit in the state |0〉 denoted by |0i〉. He then prepares
the state
(|0i1,j10i2,j20i3,j3...0im,jm0i〉+ |1i1,j11i2,j21i3,j3...1im,jm1i〉)/√2
using the circuit in Figure 2.3.4. Finally, he teleports his extra qubit to Ak1
using the EPR pair (|0i,k10k1,i〉+ |1i,k11k1,i〉)/√2, thus enabling the prepara-
tion of the (m+ 1)-partite maximally entangled state:
(|0i1,j10i2,j20i3,j3...0im,jm0k1,i〉+ |1i1,j11i2,j21i3,j3...1im,jm1k1,i〉)/√2.
Ai repeats this until no other vertex, which is connected to it by an edge in
G, is left.
Step 3 is repeated until one cbit each from the elements of L (except for T )
is broadcasted, indicating that all vertices in L as well as in V \ L have got
entangled.
Note that more than one vertex might be processing Step 3 at the same
time. This however does not matter since local operations do not change the
reduced density matrix of other qubits. Moreover, while processing the Step
3 together, such vertices will no longer be directly connected by an edge in
G.
Now we determine the communication complexity of protocol II, the num-
ber of cbits used in creating the n-partite maximally entangled state. Step
1 involves one cbit broadcast by S to signal the initiation of the protocol.
To create the GHZ state in Step 2, atmost 2 cbits is required. In Step 3,
teleportation is used to create an (m+ 1)-partite maximally entangled state
from that of m-partite. Such (n−3) teleportation steps are used in this Step
entailing 2(n−3) cbits of communication. Finally, (k−1) cbits are broadcast
by terminal vertices (except T ). Thus the total cbits used in protocol II is
1 + 2 + 2(n− 3) + k − 1 = 2n+ k − 4 ≤ 2n+ n− 1− 4 = 3n− 5 = O(n).
Protocol-II leads to the following interesting theorem.
Theorem 2 If the combinatorial arrangement of distributed EPR pairs amongst
n agents forms a spanning EPR tree, then the n-partite maximally entangled
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state (|000...0〉+ |111...1〉)/√2 can be prepared amongst them with O(n) bits
of classical communication.
Theorem 2 thus gives a sufficient condition for preparing a maximally
entangled n-partite state in a distributed network of EPR pairs. In order
to prove this sufficiency, we have also developed two more protocols which
require O(n) cbits of communication. The first two steps of these protocols
are essentially the same as that of Protocol II. The first protocol involves all
the agents already entangled in each iteration in Step 3, where, a circuit very
similar to the symmetric teleportation circuit (Figure 2.2.3) of Protocol I is
used. The classical communication cost is (2n−4) bits. The second protocol
uses a generalization of the method of Zeilinger et al. in each iteration of
Step 3 and requires (2n− 3) cbits of communication. In this paper we have
presented only Protocol II instead of these two protocols because of simplic-
ity and the direct use of teleportation.
The question of interest now is that of determining the minimal structure
or combinatorics of the distribution of EPR pairs neccessary for creating the
n-partite maximally entangled state. In other words, we wish to characterize
neccessary properties to be satisfied by the EPR graph for this purpose. We
argue below that the EPR graph, indeed, must contain a spanning EPR tree,
and must therefore be connected. We assume for the sake of contradiction
that the EPR graph G is not connected. Then, it must have at least two
components, say C1 and C2. No member of C1 is connected to any member of
C2 by an edge in G. This means that no member of C1 is sharing an EPR pair
with any member of C2. Suppose a protocol P can create a pure n-partite
maximally entangled state starting from the disconnected EPR graph G of n
agents. If we are able to create an n-partite maximally entangled state using
protocol P with this structure using only classical communication and local
operations, it is easy to see that we will also be able to create an EPR pair
between two parties that were not earlier sharing any EPR pair, using just
local operations and classical communication. This can be done as follows.
Let A be the first party that posseses all the qubits of his group (say C1)
and B be the second party that possesses all the qubits of his group (say
C2). Now the protocol P is run on this structure to create the n-partite
maximally entangled state. Then, A (B) disentangles all of his qubits except
one by reversing the circuit in Figure 2.3.4; this leaves A and B sharing an
EPR pair. This means that two parties which were never sharing an EPR
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pair are able to share it just by local operations and classical communication
(LOCC). This is forbidden by fundamental laws in quantum information
theory (LOCC cannot increase the expected entanglement [Ved02]), hence
G must be connected. Note that no qubit communication is permitted after
the formation of EPR graph G. We present this neccessary condition in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 A necessary condition that the n-partite maximally entangled
state (|000...0〉+ |111...1〉)/√2 be prepared in a distributed network permit-
ting only EPR pairs for pairwise entanglement between agents is that the
EPR graph of the n agents must be connected.
It can be noted that after the preparation of the state (|000...0〉+|111...1〉)/√2,
any other pure n-partite maximally entangled state can also be prepared by
just using local operations. We also know that any connected undirected
graph contains a spanning tree [CLR90]. Thus a connected EPR graph will
contain a spanning EPR tree. With this observations, we combine the above
two theorems in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Amongst n agents in a communication network permitting only
pairwise entanglement in the form of EPR pairs, a pure n-partite maximally
entangled state can be prepared if and only if the EPR graph of the n agents
is connected.
2.4 Entangling a Set of Agents from Entan-
gled States of Subsets: Combinatorics of
General Entanglement Structure
In the previous section we have presented the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for preparing a pure multi-partite maximally entangled state in a dis-
tributed network of EPR pairs (see Theorem 4). However, agents may not
be connected by EPR pairs in a general network. We assume that subsets
of agents may be sharing pure maximally entangled states. So, some triples
of agents may be GHZ entangled, some pairs of agents may share EPR pairs
and some subsets of agents may share even higher dimensional entangled
states.
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Now we develop the combinatorics of multi-partite entanglement within
subsets of agents required to prepare multi-partite entanglement between all
the agents. When we were dealing only with EPR pairs in the case of EPR
graphs or spanning EPR trees, we used the simple graph representation. Now
subsets of the set of all agents may be in multi-partite entangled states and
therefore we use a natural representation for such entanglement structures
with hypergraphs as follows.
Let S be the set of n agents in a communication network. Let E ⊂ S,
|E| = k. Suppose E is such that the k agents in E are in a k-partite pure
maximally entangled state. Let E1, E2, ..., Em be such subsets of S, each
having a pure maximally entangled shared state amongst its agents. Note
that the sizes of these subsets may be different. Consider the hypergraph
H = (S, F ) [GGL95, Berge89] such that F = {E1, E2, ..., Em}. We call
such a hypergraph H , an entangled hypergraph of the n agents. In standard
hypergraph notation the elements of F are called hyperedges of H . Now
we present the necessary and sufficient condition for preparing a n-partite
pure maximally entangled state in such networks, given entanglements as
per the entangled hypergraph. We need the definition of a hyperpath in a
hypergraph: a sequence of j hyperedges E1, E2, ..., Ej in a hypergraph is
called a hyperpath from a vertex a to a vertex b if (i) Ei and Ei+1 have a
common vertex (agent) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1 (ii) a and b are agents in S (iii)
a ∈ E1 and (iv) b ∈ Ej . If there is a hyperpath between every pair of vertices
of S in a hypergraph H then we say that H is connected.
Theorem 5 Given n agents in a communication network and an entangled
hypergraph, a pure n-partite maximally entangled state can be prepared
amongst the n agents if and only if the entangled hypergraph is connected.
The proof of this theorem is based on the following Protocol-III.
The Protocol III: We assume without loss of generality that n > |E1| ≥
|E2|... ≥ |Em|. We maintain the set F and R = S \ F where F contains
the agents already entangled in the |F |-partite pure maximally entangled
state. Initially, F = E1 and R = {E2, E3, ..., Em}. We repeat the following
steps until F = S. Choose Ei ∈ R with minimum i such that F and Ei
have at least one common agent and Ei is not in F ; let the smallest index
common element between Ei and F be the agent Aj . (Since the entangled
hypergraph is connected, there is always such a hyperedge Ei.) We can
25
now use the method of Zeilinger et al. to create an (N + M − 1)-partite
maximum entangled state from two groups, one containing N = |F | agents
and the other containing M = |Ei| agents. The measurement is processed
by Aj. So, an (|F | + |Ei| − 1)-partite entanglement state is prepared from
amongst the members of F and Ei. If F and Ei share only one common
agent then we are done. Otherwise, each member common to F and Ei
other than Aj will have two qubits each from the |F | + |Ei| − 1 entangled
qubits. These qubits must be disentangled using a circuit same as the reverse
of circuit in Figure 2.3.4. Now the members of F and Ei remain entangled in
(|F |+ |Ei| − |F
⋂
Ei|)-partite state, each holding exactly one qubit. Finally,
we set F = F
⋃
Ei and R = R \ Ei.
The proof of necessity is similar to that of the proof of necessity in The-
orem 3. For the sake of contradiction assume that the entangled hypergraph
H is not connected. Then there is no hyperpath between two agents (say
a and b), implying the existence of at least two components C1 and C2 in
H , with no member of C1 sharing a hyperedge of entanglement with any
member of C2. Suppose a protocol P can create a pure n-partite maximally
entangled state starting from the disconnected entangled hypergraph H of
n agents. If we are able to create an n-partite maximally entangled state
using protocol P with this structure using only classical communication and
local operations, it is easy to see that we will also be able to create an EPR
pair between two parties that were not earlier sharing any EPR pair, using
just local operations and classical communication. This is forbidden by fun-
damental laws in quantum information theory (LOCC cannot increase the
expected entanglement [Ved02, Hor01]). Hence H must be connected. This
completes the proof of Theorem 5.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We compare our method (Protocol-II) of generating multipartite maximally
entangled states with that of Bose et al. [BVK98]. The scheme of Bose et
al. works as follows. Each agent needs to share a Bell pair with a central
exchange in the communication network of n agents. The central exchange
then projects the n-qubits with him, on to the n-partite maximally entan-
gled basis. This leaves the n agents in a n-partite maximally entangled state.
Thus, the two basic requirements of their scheme are a central exchange and
a projective measurement on a multi-partite maximally entangled basis. The
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central exchange essentially represents a star topology in a communication
network and allows certain degree of freedom to entangle particles belonging
to any set of users only if the necessity arises. However, a real time communi-
cation network may not always be a star network, in which case, we may need
to have several such central exchanges. Of course, one will also be interested
in setting up such a network with minimum resources, especially in the case
of a long distance communication network. Issues involved in the design of
such central exchanges such as minimizing required resources, are of vital in-
terest while dealing with real communication networks. Such networks may
be called Quantum Local Area Network (Q-LAN or Non-LAN, a Non-Local
LAN) or Quantum Wide Area Network (Q-WAN or Non-WAN). Our scheme
presented in Section 2.3 adresses these issues. We have shown in Theorem
4 that the spanning EPR tree is the minimal combinatorial requirement for
this purpose. The star topology is a special case of the spanning EPR tree
where the central exchange is one of the agents. It is therefore clear that the
star network requirements of the scheme of Bose et al. provides a sufficient
condition where as the requirement in our spanning EPR tree scheme is the
most general and minimal possible structure.
Our scheme also helps in minimizing resources. Our spanning tree topol-
ogy has been used by Singh and Srikanth [SS03A] (Chapter 4) for this pur-
pose. They assign weights to the edges of the EPR graph based on the
resources (such as quantum repeaters, etc.) needed to build that particular
edge. Then, a minimum spanning EPR tree represents the optimized require-
ment. They also use this topology for multi-party quantum cryptography to
minimize the size of the sector that can be potentially controlled by an eves-
dropper. Thus our topology seems to be a potential candidate for building
a long distance quantum communication network (such as in a Non-LAN or
Non-WAN).
The second basic ingredient of the scheme of Bose et al. is the projection
on a multipartite maximally entangled basis. As they point out, the circuit
for such a measurement is an inverse of the circuit that generates a maxi-
mally entangled state from a disentangled input in the computational basis.
In a communication network involving a large number of agents, this entails
a lot of work to be done on part of the central exchange while the agents
are idle. In our scheme, work is distributed amongst the agents. Moreover,
the n-qubit joint measurement on the entangled basis in the scheme of Bose
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et al. seems to be well high impossible from a practical standpoint given
the current technology, whereas all the practical requirements of our scheme
(Protocol II) can be met using current technology (using telecom cables to
distribute entanglement etc).
The projection used by the central exchange in the scheme of Bose et al.
may lead to any of the 2n possible n-partite maximally entangled states. For
practical purposes, one might be more interested in a particular state. To
get the desired state, the measurement result must be broadcast by the cen-
tral exchange. The 2n possible states can be represented by a n bit number
and thus the communication complexity involved in their scheme is n cbits,
essentially the same as that of ours asymptotically. Therefore, our scheme
is comparable to their scheme also in terms of communication complexity.
It can also be noted at this point that, in our topology, even the method
of Zeilinger et al. for creating (m + 1)-partite maximally entangled state
from a m-partite maximally entangled state becomes applicable. The use
even reduces the communication complexity by some cbits but still requires
2n− 3 cbits which is O(n). As it can be observed, all these schemes require
O(n) cbits of communication. Whether there is an Ω(n) lower bound on
the cbit communication complexity for preparing n-partite a pure maximally
entangled state given a spanning EPR tree remains open for further research.
The results in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 are similar to the classical the-
orem by Helly [Val64] in convex geometry. Helly’s theorem states that a
collection of closed convex sets in the plane must have a non-empty inter-
section if each triplet of the convex sets from the collection has a non-empty
intersection. In one dimension, Helly’s theorem ensures a non-empty inter-
section of a collection of intervals if each pair of intervals has a non-empty
intersection. In our case (Theorems 4 and 5), there is similar combinatorial
nature; if n agents are such that each pair has a shared EPR pair, then (with
linear classical communication cost) a pure n-partite state with maximum
entanglement can be created entangling all the n agents. As stated in The-
orem 2, the case is stronger because just (n − 1) EPR pairs suffice. Due to
this similarity in combinatorial nature, we call our results in Theorem 4 and
Theorem 5 quantum Helly-type theorems.
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Chapter 3
A Combinatorial Approach to
Study the LOCC
Transformations of
Multipartite States
3.1 Introduction
Given the extensive use of quantum entanglement as a resource for quantum
information processing [BEZ00, NC00], its quantification has become one of
the central topics of quantum information theory and, of late, a lot of re-
search has been going on in this direction. However, apart from simple cases
(for example, low-dimensions, few particles, pure states etc.) the mathemat-
ical structure of entanglement is not yet fully understood. In particular, the
entanglement properties of bipartite states have been widely explored (see
[Brus02, Hor01] for a comprehensive review). Fortunately, bipartite states
possess a nice mathematical property in the form of the Schmidt decompo-
sition [NC00] which encompasses their all non-local peroperties. However,
the entangled states involving more than two parties lack such convenient
form and so it is difficult to characterize them. Some approches, essentially
using the generalization of Schmidt decomposition, have been taken in this
direction [BPRST00, Kempe99, Par04] ; however a general formulation in
this case is still an outstanding unresolved problem.
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State transformations under local operations and classical communication
(LOCC) are very important while quantifying entanglement because LOCC
can at the best increase classical correlations and therefore a good measure of
entanglement is not supposed to increase under LOCC. A necessary and suf-
ficient condition for such transformation to be possible with certainty in the
case of bipartite states was given by Nielsen [Niel99] and an immediate conse-
quence of his result was the existence of incomparable states (the states which
can not be obtained by LOCC from one another). Bennett et al. [BPRST00]
formalized the notions of reducibility, equivalance and imcomparability to
multi-partite states and gave a sufficient condition for incomparability based
on partial entropic criteria.
All the current approaches to study the state transformation under LOCC
are based on entropic criterion. In this work, we present a entirely different
approach based on nice combinatorial properties of graphs and set systems.
We introduce a technique called bicolored merging and obtain several results
about such transformations. We demostrate a partial ordering of multi-
partite states and various classes of incomparable multi-partite states. We
utilize these results to establish the impossibility of doing selective teleporta-
tion in a case where the apriori entanglement is in the form of a GHZ state.
We also discuss the minimum number of copies of a state required to pre-
pare another state by LOCC and present bounds on this number in terms of
quantum distance between the two states. The ideas developed in this work
continues the combinatorial setting developed in Chapter 2 and can been
extended to incorporate other new kinds of multi-partite states. Moreover,
the idea of bicolored merging may also be appropriate to some other areas of
information sciences.
3.2 The Combinatorial Framework
In this section we first revise the combinatorics developed in Chapter 2 and
introduce the framework for deriving our results.
Definition 3 EPR Graph: For n agents A1, A2, · · · , An an undirected graph
G = (V,E) is constructed as follows:
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V = {Ai : i = 1, 2, · · · , n} , E = {{Ai, Aj} : Ai andAj share an EPR pair, 1 ≤
i, j ≤ n; i 6= j}.
The graph G = (V,E) thus formed is called the EPR graph of the n
agents.
Definition 4 Spanning EPR Tree: An EPR graph G = (V,E) is called a
spanning EPR tree if the undirected graph G = (V,E) is a spanning tree.
Definition 5 Entangled Hypergraph: Let S be the set of n agents and
F = {E1, E2, · · · , Em}, where Ei ⊂ S; i = 1, 2, · · · , m and Ei is such that
its elements (agents) are in |Ei|-partite pure maximally entangled state. The
hypergraph (set system) H = (S, F ) is called an entangled hypergraph of the
n agents.
Definition 6 Connected Entangled Hypergraph: A sequence of j hyper-
edges E1, E2, ..., Ej in a hypergraph H = (S, F ) is called a hyperpath (path)
from a vertex a to a vertex b if
1. Ei and Ei+1 have a common vertex for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1,
2. a and b are agents in S,
3. a ∈ E1, and
4. b ∈ Ej .
If there is a hyperpath between every pair of vertices of S in the hypergraph
H , we say that H is connected.
Definition 7 Entangled Hypertree: A connected entangled hypergraph
H = (S, F ) is called an entangled hypertree if it contains no cycles, that
is, there do not exist any pair of vertices from S such that there are two
paths between them.
Definition 8 r-Uniform Entangled Hypertree: An entangled hypertree is
called a r-uniform entangled hypertree if all of its hyperedges are of size r.
Theorem 6 If any two pairs of the three agents A, B and C share EPR
pairs (say the state (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2) then we can prepare a GHZ state
(|000〉+ |111〉)/√2) amongst them with two bits of classical communication,
while involving all the three agents dynamically.
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We would henceforth refer the protocol developed in [SKP03] (Chapter
2) in order to establish Theorem 6 as SKP-1.
Theorem 7 Amongst n agents in a communication network permitting only
pairwise entanglement in the form of EPR pairs, a pure n-partite maximally
entangled state can be prepared if and only if the EPR graph of the n agents
is connected.
We shall use the name SKP-2 to refer to the protocol suggested in [SKP03]
(Chapter 2) to prove the sufficiency of Theorem 7.
Theorem 8 Given n agents in a communication network and an entangled
hypergraph, a pure n-partite entangled state can be prepared amongst the n
agents if and only if the entangled hypergraph is connected.
We shall use the name SKP-3 to refer to the protocol suggested in [SKP03]
(Chapter 2) to prove the sufficiency of the above theorem.
3.3 Bicolored Merging
Monotonicity is easily the most natural characteristic that ought to be satis-
fied by all entanglement measures [Hor01]. This means that any appropriate
measure of entanglement must not change by local unitary operations and
more generally the expected entanglement must not increase under LOCC.
We should note here that in LOCC, LO involves unitary transformations, ad-
ditions of ancillas (that is, enlarging the Hilbert Space), measurements, and
throwing away parts of the system, each of these actions performed by one
party on his or her subsystem. CC between the parties allows local actions
by one party to be conditioned on the outcomes of the earlier measurements
performed by the other parties.
Apart from monotonicity, there are certain other characteristics required
to be satisfied by the entanglement measures. It is interesting to note (as
we show in this work) that monotonicity itself restricts a large number of
state transformations and gives rise to several classes of incomparable (multi-
partite) states. Thus, to study the possible state transformations of (multi-
partite) states under LOCC, it would be interesting to look at the kind of
state transforms under LOCC which monotonicity does not allow. We can
32
observe that monotonicity does not allow the preparation of n + 1 or more
EPR pairs between two parties starting from only n EPR pairs between them.
In particular, it is not possible to prepare two or more EPR pairs between
two parties starting only with a single EPR pair and only LOCC. This is
an example of impossible state transformation in bipartite case as dictated
by the monotonicity postulate. Thus, we might anticipate that a large class
of multi-partite states could also be shown to be incomparable just by us-
ing impossibility results in bipartite case through a suitable reduction. For
example, consider transforming (under LOCC) the state represented by a
spanning EPR tree, say T1, to that of the state represented by the spanning
EPR tree, say T2. (See the Figure 3.3.1). This transformation can be shown
to be impossible by reducing to the bipartite case as follows: Let us assume
that there exists a protocol P which can perform the required transforma-
tion. It is easy to see that the protocol P is also applicable in the case when
a party A possesses all the qubits of parties 4, 5, 6, and 7 and all the qubits
of the parties 1, 2, and 3 are possessed by another party B. This means that
party A is playing the role of all the parties 4, 5, 6, and 7 and B is playing
the role of all the parties 1, 2, and 3. Therefore for the protocol P , these two
parties represent the complete EPR spanning tree T1. It is indeed reasonable
as any LOCC actions done amongst {1, 2, 3} ({4, 5, 6, 7}) is reduced to just
LO done by B (A) and any CC done between one party from {1, 2, 3} and
the other from {4, 5, 6, 7} is managed by CC between B and A. Thefore,
starting only with one edge (e3) they eventually construct T1 just by LO
(by local creation of EPR pairs representing the edges e1, e2, e4, e5, and e6;
{e1, e2} by B and {e4, e5, e6} by A). They then apply protocol P to obtain T2
with the edges f1, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f6. (Refer to the Figure 3.3.2). All edges
except f2 and f3 are local EPR pairs (that is, both qubits are with the same
party). Now the parties A and B share two EPR pairs in the form of the
edges f2 and f3, though they started with sharing only one EPR pair. This
is actually an impossible state transformation under LOCC in the bipartite
case. Hence, we can conclude that such a protocol P can not exist! The
complete reduction process is shown in Figure 3.3.2 below.
In general, suppose we want to show that the multi-partite state |ψ〉 can
not be converted to the multi-partite state |φ〉 by LOCC. This can be done
by showing an assignment of the qubits (of all parties) only to two parties
such that |ψ〉 can be obtained from n (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) EPR pairs between
the two parties by LOCC while |φ〉 can be converted to more than n EPR
33
1
e1
3
2
e2
e34
5
6 7
e4
e5 e
the spanning tree T 1
1
 2
53
 4
6
7
f1
f2
f3 f4
f5
f6
the spanning tree T 2
6
F
igu
re
3.3.1:
T
h
e
sp
an
n
in
g
E
P
R
trees
T
1
an
d
T
2
34
A  B
LO
Local creation of 
{e1, e2} by B and
{e4, e5, e6} by A
e3
one EPR pair 
between A 
and B
B{1}
e1 e2
B{3}
B{2}
e3
A{4}
e4
e5 e6
A{5}
A{6} A{7}
P
(if it 
exists)LOCC
B{2}
B{1}
A{5}B{3}
A{4}
A{6}
A{7}
f1
f2
f3
f4
f5
f6
LO
A{4,5,6,7}
B{1,2}
B{3} f3
f2
Two EPR pairs between 
      A and B
an impossible
state transformation
under LOCC
{4,5,6,7}
{1,2,3}
F
igu
re
3.3.2:
C
on
vertin
g
T
1
to
T
2
u
n
d
er
L
O
C
C
th
rou
gh
P
35
pairs between the two parties by LOCC. This is equivalent to saying that
each party is given either of two colors (say A or B). Finally all qubits with
parties colored with color A are assigned to the first party (say A) and that
with parties colored with second color to the second party (say B). This
coloring is done in such a way that the state |ψ〉 can be obtained by LOCC
from less number of EPR pairs between A and B than that can be obtained
from |φ〉 by LOCC. Local preparation (or throwing away) of EPR pairs is
what we call merging in combinatorial sense. Keeping this idea in mind, we
now formally introduce the idea of bicolored merging for such reductions in
the case of the multi-partite states represented by EPR graphs and entangled
hypergraphs.
Suppose that there are two EPR graphs G1 = (V,E1) and G2 = (V,E2) on
the same vertex set V (meaning that the two multi-partite states are shared
amongst the same set of parties) and we want to show the impossibility of
transforming G1 to G2 under LOCC, then this is reduced to a bipartite LOCC
transformation which violates monotonicity, as follows:
1. Bicoloring: Assign either of the two colors A or B to every vertex, that
is, each element of V .
2. Merging: For each element {vi, vj} of E1, merge the two vertices vi and
vj if and only if they have been assigned the same color during the
bicoloring stage and assign the same color to the merged vertex. Call
this graph obtained from G1 as BCM (Bicolored-Merged) EPR graph
of G1 and denote it by G
bcm
1 . Similarily, obtain the BCM EPR graph
Gbcm2 of G2.
3. The bicoloring and merging is done in such a way that the graph Gbcm2
has more number of edges than that of Gbcm1 .
4. Give all the qubits possessed by the vertices with color A to the first
party (say, party A) and all the qubits possessed by the vertices with
color B to the second party (say, party B). Combining this with the
previous steps, it is ensured that in the bipartite reduction of the multi-
partite state represented by G2, the two parties A and B share more
number of EPR pairs (say, state |ψ2〉) than that for G1 (say, state |ψ1〉).
Now if there exits a protocol P which can transform G1 to G2 by LOCC,
then P can also transform |ψ1〉 to |ψ2〉 just by LOCC as follows: A (B) will
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play the role of all vertices in V which were colored as A (B). The edges
which were removed due to merging can easily be cretated by local opera-
tions (local preparation of EPR pairs) by the party A (B) if the color of the
merged end-vertices of the edge was assigned color A (B). This means that
starting from |ψ1〉 and only LO, G1 can be created. This graph is virtually
amongst |V | parties even though there are only two parties. The protocol P
then, can be applied to G1 to obtain G2 by LOCC. Subsequently |ψ2〉 can
be obtained by the necessary merging of vertices by LO, that is by throw-
ing away the local EPR pair represented by the edges between the vertices
being merged. Since the preparation of |ψ2〉 from |ψ1〉 by LOCC violates
monotonocity postulate, such a protocol P can not exist! An example of
bicolored merging for EPR graphs has been illustrated in Figure 3.3.3.
The bicolored merging in the case of entangled hypergraphs is essentially
the same as that for EPR graphs. For the sake of completeness, we present
it here. Suppose there are two entangled hypergraphs H1 = (S, F1) and
H2 = (S, F2) on the same vertex set S (that is, the two multi-partite states are
shared amongst the same set of parties) and we want to show the impossibility
of transforming H1 to H2 under LOCC. Transformation of H1 to H2 can be
reduced to a bipartite LOCC transformation which violates monotonicity
thus proving the impossibility. The reduction is done as follows:
1. Bicoloring: Assign either of the two colors A or B to every vertex, that
is, each element of S.
2. Merging: For each element E = {vi1, vi2, · · · , vij} of F1, merge all ver-
tices with color A to one vertex and those with color B to another
vertex and give them colors A and B respectively. This merging col-
lapses each hyperedge to either a simple edge or a vertex and thus the
hypergraph reduces to a simple graph with vertices assigned with either
of the two colors A or B. Call this graph obtained from H1 as BCM
EPR graph of H1 and denote it by H
bcm
1 . Similarily obtain the BCM
EPR graph Hbcm2 of H2.
3. The bicoloring and merging is done in such a way that the graph Hbcm2
has more number of edges than that of Hbcm1 .
4. Give all the qubits possessed by the vertices with color A to the party
one (say party A) and all the qubits possessed by the vertices with
color B to the second party (say party B).
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Rest of the discussion goes exactly as in the EPR graph case. In the Figure
3.3.4 below, we demostrate the bicolored merging of entangled hypergraphs.
It is interesting to note at this point that the LOCC incomparability
shown by using the method of bicolored merging is in fact strong incompa-
rability [BRS02]. We would also like to stress that any kind of reduction (in
particular, various possible extensions of bicolored merging) which leads to
the violation of any of the properties of a potential entanglement measure,
is pertinent to show the impossibility of many multi-partite state transfor-
mations under LOCC. Since the bipartite case has been extensively studied,
such reductions can potentially provide many ideas about multi-partite case
by just exploiting the results from bipartite case. In particular, the definitions
of EPR graphs and entangled hypergraphs could also be suitably extended
to capture more types of multi-partite pure states and even mixed states and
a generalization of the idea of bicolored merging as a suitable reduction for
this case could also be worked out. It would be interesting to investigate
such issues.
3.4 Irreversibility of SKP-1 and Selective Tele-
portation
We know that a GHZ state amongst three agents A, B and C can be pre-
pared from EPR pairs shared between any two pairs of the three agents using
only LOCC [SKP03]. We consider the problem of reversing this operation,
that is, whether it is possible to construct two EPR pairs between any two
pairs of the three agents from a GHZ state amongst the three agents, using
only LOCC. By using the method of bicolored merging, we show below that
this is not possible.
Suppose there exists a protocol P for reversing a GHZ state into two EPR
pairs using only LOCC. More precisely, protocol P starts with a GHZ state
amongst the agents A, B and C, and prepares EPR pairs between any two
pairs of A, B and C (say, A and C, and B and C). Since we can prepare
the GHZ state from EPR pairs between any two pairs of the three agents,
we can prepare the GHZ state starting from EPR pairs between A and B,
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and A and C. Once the GHZ state is prepared, we can apply protocol P
to construct EPR pairs between A and C and between B and C using only
LOCC. So, we can use only LOCC to convert a configuration where EPR
pairs exist between A and C and between A and B, to a configuration where
EPR pairs are shared between A and C and between B and C. It can be
noted that the configuration where the two EPR pairs are shared between
A,B and A,C (say, EPR graph G1) is symmetrical with respect to the GHZ
state amongst A,B and C to the configuration where the two EPR pairs are
shared between A,C and B,C (say, the EPR graph G2). Apply the bicolored
merging by giving the color A to parties A and B and the color B to the
party C. We can observe that A and C start with a single EPR pair between
themselves and (by only LOCC) end up sharing two EPR pairs between
themselves (Figure 3.4.5). The same result could also be achieved by similar
bicolored merging directly applied on the GHZ state and any of G1 or G2
but we prefer the above proof for stressing the argument on the symmetry of
G1 and G2 with respect to the GHZ. Moreover, this proof gives an intuition
about possibility of incomparability amongst spanning EPR trees as G1 and
G2 are two distinct spanning EPR trees on three vertices. We prove this
general result in the Theorem 17
By repeatedly applying the protocol P (if possible), we can indeed pre-
pare as many EPR pairs bewteen A and C (using only LOCC) as we wish,
starting from a single shared EPR pair. This is impossible and so our asser-
tion is proved. We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 Starting from a GHZ state shared amongst three parties in a
communication network, two EPR pairs can not be created between any two
sets of two parties using only LOCC.
The above theorem motivates us to think of some kind of comparison
between a GHZ state and two pairs of EPR pairs in terms of the non-local
correlations they possess. In this sense, therefore, a GHZ state is stictly less
than two EPR pairs. This is also easy to see that an EPR pair between any
two parties can be obtained starting only from a GHZ state shared amongst
the three parties and LOCC. The third party will just do a measurement
and send the result to other two. By applying the corresponding suitable
operations they get the required EPR pair. Using the necessary conditions
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presented in [SKP03] (Chapter 2) to prepare a multi-partite entangled state
starting from only bi-partite entanglement in a distibuted network, we ob-
serve that an EPR pair between any two of the three parites is not sufficient
for preparing a GHZ state amongst the three parties using only LOCC. These
arguments can be summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 10 1-EPR pair <LOCC a GHZ state <LOCC 2-EPR pairs
An interesting problem in quantum information theory is that of selec-
tive teleportation [Samal]. Given three agents A, B and C, and two qubits
of unknown quantum states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 with A, the problem is to send
|ψ1〉 to B and |ψ2〉 to C selectively, using only LOCC and apriori entan-
glement between the three agents. A simple solution to this problem is by
applying standard teleportation [BBCJPW93], in the case where A shares
EPR pairs with both B and C. An interesting question is whether any other
form of apriori entanglement can help achieving selective teleportation. In
particular, is it possible to perform selective teleportation where the apriori
entanglement is in the form of a GHZ state amongst the three agents. Fol-
lowing theorem answers this question using the result of the Theorem 9.
Theorem 11 With a prior entanglement given in the form of a GHZ state
shared amongst three agents, two qubits can not be selectively teleported by
ane of the three parties to the other two parties.
Proof: Suppose there exists a protocol P which can enable one of the
three parties (say A) to teleport two qubits |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 selectively to the
other two parties (say B and C). Now A takes four qubits; she prepares two
EPR pairs one from the first and second qubits and the other from the third
and fourth qubits. He then teleports the first and third qubits selectively to
B and C using P ( consider first qubit as |ψ1〉 and the third qubie as |ψ2〉
). We can note here that in this way A is able to share one EPR pair each
with B and C. But this is impossible for it enables A to prepare two EPR
pairs starting from a GHZ state and only using LOCC which already we have
proved (Theorem 9) not to be possible. Hence follows the result. ✷
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3.5 A Partial Ordering of Entangled Hyper-
graphs
In this section, we investigate whether some kind of comparison and ordering
can be made between various multi-partite entangled states based on the
non-local content contained in them and establish the following theorems.
Theorem 12 None of the inductive steps of SKP-2 can be reversed. Hence
the non-local content contained in the multi-partite state represented by the
structure in a step is stictly less than that of the multi-partite states repre-
sented by the structure in the subsequent steps.
Proof: The proof goes much similar as the proof of irreversibility of SKP-
1. Suppose in an inductive step the m parties {i1, i2, · · · , im} already entan-
gled in a m-partite maximally entangled state, with help of EPR pair shared
between im and im+1 (call this configuration C1) prepare an (m+ 1)-partite
maximally entangled state amongst {i1, i2, · · · , im, im+1} ( call this configura-
tion C). We are interested in proving the impossibility of reversing this step.
For the sake of contradiction assume that such a protocol P for this revers-
ing exists. Then it is also easy to see that starting with the (m + 1)-partite
maximally entangled state amongst {i1, i2, · · · , im, im+1} and using LOCC
one can get a configuration (call C2) where the parties {i1, i2, · · · , im+1} are
in m-partite maximally entangled state and parties im and im+1 are sharing
an EPR pair (use the symmetry argument as in the proof of irreversibility of
SKP-1). Thus it is possible to convert state represented by C1 to that by C2
just using LOCC by first converting C1 to C by the inductive step of SKP-2
and subsequently applying P to C. This state transformation under LOCC
from C1 to C2 is shown impossible by bicolored merging where the color A
is asigned to the parties {i1, i2, · · · , im} and the color B to the party im+1.
The detail is suggested in the Figure 3.5.6. ✷
Theorem 13 None of the inductive steps of SKP-3 can be reversed. Hence
the non-local content contained in the multi-partite state represented by the
entangled hypergraph in a step is strictly less than that of the multi-partite
state represented by the entangled hypergraphs in the subsequent steps.
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Figure 3.5.6: Inductive steps of SKP-2 are irreversible
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Proof: The proof is exactly same as the proof of the last theorem using
bicolored merging and we just depict it by Figure 3.5.7. ✷
It is worth noting at this point that the above theorems gives partial
orderings of multi-partite states. This order thus relatively quantifies the
entanglement for these states.
3.6 Classifying Multi-partite Entanglement.
An immediate result comparing an n-CAT state with EPR pairs follows from
Theorem 10 and Theorem 12.
Theorem 14 1−EPR <LOCC n− CAT <LOCC (n− 1)− EPR.
On similar lines we can argue that an n-CAT state amongst n-parties
can not, by just using LOCC, be converted to any form of entanglement
structure which possess EPR pairs between any two or more different sets of
two parties. Let this be possible then the two edges could be in either of the
two forms:
(1) {i1, i2} and {j1, j2}
(2) {i1, i2} and {i2, j2}
where i1, i2, j1, j2 are all distinct.
In bicolor-merging assign the colors as follows:
In case (1), give color A to i2 and j2 and give the color B to the rest of
the vertices.
In case (2), give color A to i2 and color B to the rest of the vertices.
Thus our above assertion follows. Moreover, from the necessity condition
in [SKP03] (Chapter 2) for preparing an n-CAT state, no disconncted EPR
graph would be able to yield n-CAT just by LOCC. These two observations
combined together leads to the following theorem which signifies the fact that
these two multi-partite states can not be compared.
Theorem 15 A CAT state amongst n agents in a communication network
is LOCC incomparable to any disconnected EPR graph associated with the
n agents having more than one edge.
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Figure 3.5.7: Inductive steps of SKP-3 are irreversible
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The above result indicates that there are many possible form of entangle-
ment structures (multi-partite states) which can not be compared at all in
terms of non-local contents they deserve to have and this simple result was
just an implication of the necessity combinatorics required for the preparation
of the CAT states. One more interesting question while still in the domain of
that combinatorics is to compare an spanning EPR tree and a CAT state. An
spanning EPR tree is a sufficient combinatorics to prepare the CAT state and
thus seems to entail more non-local content than in a CAT state but whether
in a strict sense is still required to be investigated. It is easy to see that an
EPR pair between any two parites can be obtained starting from a CAT state
shared amongst the n agents just by LOCC (theorem14). Therefore, given
n−1 copies of the CAT state we can build all the n−1 edges of any spanning
EPR tree just by LOCC. But whether this is the lower bound on the number
of copies of n-CAT required to obtain an spanning EPR tree is even more
interesting. The following theorem shows that this indeed is the lower bound.
Theorem 16 Starting with only n−2 copies of n-CAT state shared amongst
its n agents, any spanning EPR tree of the n agents can not be obtained just
by LOCC.
Proof: Suppose it is possible to create a spanning EPR tree T from (n−2)
copies of n-CAT states. As we know, an n-CAT state can be prepared from
any spanning EPR tree by LOCC (use SKP-2). Thus if (n − 2) copies of
n-CAT can be converted to T then (n− 2) copies of any spanning EPR tree
can be converted to T just by LOCC. In particular, (n− 2) copies of a chain
EPR graph (which is clearly a spanning EPR tree) can be converted to T
just by LOCC. Now, we know that any tree is a bipartite connected graph
with n − 1 edges across the two parts. Let i1, i2, · · · , im be the members of
first group and the rest are in the other group. Construct a chain EPR graph
where the first m vertices are i1, i2, ..., and im in a sequence and the rest of
vertices are from the other group in the sequence (Figure 3.6.8). As in our
usual proofs, we give the color A to the parties {i1, i2, · · · , im} and the rest of
the parties are given the color B. This way we are able to create (n−1) EPR
pairs (Note that there are n− 1 edges in T across the two groups) between
A and B starting only from (n− 2) EPR pairs. Therefore, we conclude that
(n − 2) copies of n-CAT can not be converted to any spanning EPR tree
just by LOCC. See Figure 3.6.8 for illustration of required bicolored merg-
ing. The proof could also be acheived by similar kind of bicolored merging
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directly applied on n-CAT and T . ✷
In the preceding results we tried to compare an spanning EPR trees with
CAT states. What about two different spanning EPR trees? Are they com-
parable ? The following theorem targets to answer these questions.
Theorem 17 Any two distinct spanning EPR trees are LOCC-incomparable.
Proof: Let T1 and T2 be the two respective spanning EPR trees. By the
way of number of edges (n−1) in the spanning tree, there exists two vertices
(say i and j) which are connected by an edge in T2 but not in T1. Also by
virtue of connectedness of spanning trees, there will be a path between i and
j in T1. Let this path be ik1k2 · · ·kmj with m > 0 (See figure 3.6.9). Since
m > 0, k1 must exist.
Let T 1i = subtree in T1rooted at i except for the branch which contains
the edge {i, k1}.
T 1j = subtree in T1 rooted at j except for the branch which contains the
edge {j, km}.
Tkr = subtree in T1 rooted at kr except for the branches which contain
either of the edges {Kr−1, kr} and {Kr, kr+1} (k0 = i, km+1 = j).
Let T 2i = subtree in T2rooted at i except for the branch which contains
the edge {i, j}.
T 2j = subtree in T2 rooted at j except for the branch which contains the
edge {i, j}.
It is easy to see that the set T 2i
⋃
T 2j is not empty for T1 and T2 being
distint must contain more than two vertices. Also T 2i and T
2
j are disjoint
otherwise there will be a path between i and j in T2 which does not contain
the edge {i, j}, and there will be thus two paths between i and j contradict-
ing the fact that T2 is a spanning EPR tree (Figure 3.6.9). With these two
charactistics of T 2i and T
2
j , it is clear that k1 will lie either in T
2
i or in T
2
j .
Without loss of generality let us assume that k1 ∈ T 2i . Now we do bicolored
merging where the color A is assigned to i and all vertices in T 1i and rest of
the vertices are assigned the color B. Refer to Figure 3.6.9 for illustraion.
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Since T1 and T2 were choosen arbitrarily, the same arguments also imply that
there can not exist a protocol which can convert T2 to T1. Hence we lead to
conclusion that any two distinct spanning EPR trees are LOCC imcompara-
ble.
Corollary 1 There are exponentially many LOCC-incomparable pure multi-
partite entangled states.
Proof: We know from results in graph theory [Deo74] that on a labelled graph
on n vertices, there are nn−2 different spanning trees possible. Hence there
are nn−2 different spanning EPR trees in a network of n agents. From the
theorem 17 all these spanning EPR trees are LOCC imcomparable. Hence
the result.
Since entangled hypergraphs represent more general entanglement struc-
tures than that represented by the EPR graphs (in particular spanning EPR
trees are nothing but 2-uniform entangled hypertrees), it is likely that there
will be even more classes of incomparable multi-partite states and this mo-
tivates us for generalizing the theorem 17 for entangled hypertrees, however
remarkably this intuition does not work directly and there are entangled hy-
pertrees which are not incomparable. An immediate contradiction comes
from the partial ordering of entangled hypergraphs dictated by the theorem
13. However, there are still a large number of entangled hypertrees which do
not fall under any such partial ordering and thus remains incomparable. We
investigate such states here below. We need this important definition.
Definition 9 Pendant Vertex: A vertex of a hypergraph H = (S, F ) such
that it belongs to only one hyperedge of F is called a pendant vertex in
H . Vertices which belong to more than one hyperedge of H are called non-
pendant.
We are now ready to present our first imcomparability result on entangled
hypergraphs.
Theorem 18 Let H1 = (S, F1) and H2 = (S, F2) be two entangled hyper-
trees. Let P1 and P2 be the set of pendant vertices of H1 and H2 respectively.
If the sets P1\P2 and P2\P1 are both non-empty then the multi-partite states
represented by H1 and H2 are necessarily LOCC-incomparable.
52
Proof: First we show by using bicolored merging that H1 can not be
converted to H2 under LOCC. Impossibility of the reverse conversion will
also be immediate. From the hypothesis, P1 \ P2 is non-empty, therefore
there exists u ∈ S such that u ∈ P1 \P2. This means to say that u is pendant
in H1 but non-pendant in H2.
The bicolored merging is then done where the color A is assigned to the
vertex u and all other vertices are assigned the color B. This way H1 reduces
to a single EPR pair shared between the two parties A and B where as H2
reduces to two EPR pairs shared between A and B. The complete becolored
merging is shown in figure 3.6.10. ✷
We can note that this proof does not utilize the fact that H1 and H2 are
entangled hypertrees, and thus the theorem is indeed true even for entangled
hypergraphs satifying the conditions specified on the set of pendant vertices.
The conditions specified on the set of pendant vertices in the theorem 18
cover a very small fraction of the entangled hypergraphs. However this condi-
tion is not necessary and thus there may be other classes and characterization
which can decipher such incomparable classes of entangled hypergraphs. In
passing we first give some examples, for whenever the above conditions are
not satisfied H1 and H2 may or may not be incomparable.
Example-1:(Figures 3.6.11 and 3.6.12) P1 6= P2 but either P1 ⊂ P2 or
P2 ⊂ P1.
Example-2: (Figure 3.6.13) P1 = P2
Theorem 17 shows that two EPR spanning trees are LOCC incomparable
and the spanning EPR trees are nothing but 2-uniform entangled hypertrees.
Therefore, a natural generalization of this theorem would be to r-uniform en-
tangled hypertrees for any r ≥ 3. As we show below the generalization indeed
holds. It should be noted that the theorem 18 does not necessarily capture
such entanglement structures (multi-partite states) (Figure 3.6.14).
However, while proving the fact that two different r-uniform entangled
hypertrees are LOCC incomparable we shall need an important result about
r-uniform hypertrees. We state this result in the following theorem for sake
of continuity and completeness, however we defer its proof to the apendix.
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Theorem 19 Given two different r-uniform hypertrees H1 = (S, F1) and
H2 = (S, F2) with r ≥ 3, there exists vertices u, v ∈ S such that u and v
belong to same hyperedge in H2 but necessarily in different hyperedges in
H1.
Now we prove our one of the main result on LOCC incomparability of
multi-partite entangled states and establish the following theorem.
Theorem 20 Any two distinct r-uniform entangled hypertrees are LOCC-
imcomparable.
Proof: Let H1 = (S, F1) and H2 = (S, F2) be the two r-uniform entangled
hypertrees. If r = 2 then H1 and H2 happens to be two different spanning
EPR trees and the proof follows from the theorem 17. Therefore, let r ≥ 3.
Now from theorem 19, there exits u, v ∈ S such that u and v belong
to same hyperedge in H2 but necessarily in different hyperedges in H1. Let
the same hyperedge in H2 be E ∈ F2. Also, since H1 being hypertree is
connected, there exists a path between u and v in H1. Let this path be
uE1E2 · · ·Ek+1v. Clearly k > 0 because u and v necessarily do not belong
to the same hyperedge in H1.
We keep the following notations (figure 3.6.15).
T 1u : sub-hypertree rooted at u in H1 except that branch which contains
E1.
T 1v : sub-hypertree rooted at v in H1 except that branch which contains
Ek+1.
Twi : sub-hypertree rooted at wi in H1 except that branches which contain
Ei and Ei+1.
TEi : Collection of all sub-hypertrees in H1 rooted at some vertices in Ei
other than wi−1 and wi (where w0 = u and wk+1 = v) except for the branches
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Figure 3.6.15: Two distinct r-uniform entangled hypertrees
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which contain Ei.
T = ((E1
⋃
E2
⋃ · · ·⋃Ek+1)⋃(TE1⋃TE2⋃ · · ·⋃TEk+1)⋃(Tw1⋃Tw2 ⋃ · · ·⋃Twk))\
{u, v}
= set of all vertices from S \ {u, v} which are not contained in Tu
⋃
Tv.
T 2u : sub-hypertree rooted at u inH2 except that branch which contains E.
T 2v : sub-hypertree rooted at v inH2 except that branch which contains E.
TE : Collection of all sub-hypertrees in H2 rooted at some vertices in
E \ {u, v} except for the branches which contain E.
We break the proof in to the various cases:
CASE S1: ∃w ∈ T such that w ∈ (T 2u
⋃
T 2v )
Without loss of generality let us take w ∈ T 2u . Now since w ∈ T , w ∈
exactly one of Ei, Twi, or TEi for some i. Accordingly there will be three
subcases.
Case S11 : w ∈ Ei for some i.
Do bicolored merging where the vertex u along with all the vertices in
Tu, E1, E2, · · · , Ei−1, Tw1 , Tw2, · · · , Twi−1, TE1 , TE2, · · · , TEi−1
are given the color A and the rest of the vertices are given the color B.
Case S12 w ∈ Twi for some i.
Do the bicolored merging while assigning the colors as in the above case.
Case S13 w ∈ TEi for some i.
Bicolored merging in this case is also same as in Case S11 .
CASE S2: There does not exist any w ∈ T such that w ∈ T 2u
⋃
T 2v .
Clearly, T 2u
⋃
T 2v ⊂ T 1u
⋃
T 1v and T ⊂ TE
⋃
(E \ {u, v}). Note that when-
ever, we are talking of set relations like union ,containments etc. we are
considering the trees, edges etc as sets of appropriate vertices from S which
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make them. First we establish the following claim.
Claim: ∃t ∈ (E1 \ {u, w1})
⋃
(E2 \ {w1, w2}) such that t ∈ TE .
We have k > 0 therefore, both E1 and E2 exist and since H1 is r-uniform
|E1| = |E2| = r. Also (E1 \ {u, w1})
⋂
(E2 \ {w1, w2}) is empty otherwise
there will be a cycle in H1 which is not possible as H1 is a hypertree [GGL95,
Berge89]. Therefore,
|(E1 \ {u, w1}
⋃
(E2 \ {w1, w2})| = |(E1 \ {u, w1}| + |E2 \ {w1, w2}| =
(r − 2) + (r − 2) = 2r − 4.
Also |E| = r implying that |E \ {u, v}| = (r − 2).
It is clear that u, v /∈ (E1 \ {u, w1})
⋃
(E2 \ {w1, w2}).
|(E1\{u, w1})
⋃
(E2\{w1, w2})|−|E\{u, v}| = (2r−4)−(r−2) = r−2 ≥ 1
since r ≥ 3.
Also (E1 \ {u, w1})
⋃
(E2 \ {w1, w2}) ⊂ T ⊂ TE
⋃
(E \ {u, v}),
therefore, by Pigeonhole principle [LW92],
∃t ∈ (E1 \ {u, w1})
⋃
(E2 \ {w1, w2})
and
t ∈ TE(/∈ (E \ {u, v})).
Hence our claim is true.
Now we have t ∈ (E1 \ {u, w1})
⋃
(E2 \ {w1, w2}) such that t ∈ TE. Since
t ∈ TE , by the definition of TE it is clear that there must exist w ∈ E \{u, v}
such that t ∈ Tw, the sub-hypertree in H2 rooted at w except for the branch
containing E. Depending on whether t ∈ E1\{u, w1} or t ∈ E2\{w1, w2}, we
break this case in to several subcases and futher in sub-subclasses depending
on the part in H1 where w lie.
CASE S21 : t ∈ E1 \ {u, w1} (Figure 3.6.16).
CASE S211 : w ∈ Tu.
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Do the bicolored merging where u and the vertices in Tu are assigned the
color A and the rest of the vertices from S are given the color B.
CASE S212 : w ∈ Tv.
Bicolored merging is done where v as well as all the vertices in Tv are
assigned the color B and rest of the vertices from S are given the color A.
CASE S213 : w ∈ T .
Here in this case, depending on whether w is in Tt or not there can be
two cases.
case S1213 : w ∈ Tt.
Bicolored merging is done where all the vertices in Tt are given the color
A and rest of the vertices are assigned the color B.
case S2213 : w /∈ Tt.
w /∈ Tt implies that either w ∈ Ei for some i or w ∈ Tq where q ∈ Ei for
some i and q 6= t. In any of these possibilities the bicolored merging is same
and is done as follows.
Assign the color A to u as well as all vertices in
Tu
⋃
E1
⋃
TE1
⋃
Tw1
⋃ · · ·⋃Ei−1⋃TEi−1 ⋃Twi−1 ⋃(Ei\{q, w, wi})⋃(TEi\
Tq)
and rest of the vertices are assigned the color B.
CASE S22 : i ∈ E2 \ {w1, w2} (Figure 3.6.17).
CASE S221 : w ∈ Tu
⋃
E1
⋃
TE1
⋃
Tw1 .
Do the bicolored merging where all the vertices in Tu
⋃
E1
⋃
TE1
⋃
Tw1
including u are given the color A and rest of the vertices are assigned the
color B.
CASE S222 : w ∈ Tv
⋃
TEk+1
⋃
Ek+1
⋃
Twk
⋃ · · ·⋃TE3⋃E3⋃Tw2.
In bicolored merging give the color B to all the vertices (including v) in
Tv
⋃
TEk+1
⋃
Ek+1
⋃
Twk
⋃ · · ·⋃TE3⋃E3⋃Tw2
and color A to the rest of the vertices.
CASE S223 : w ∈ E2
⋃
TE2 .
In this case depending on whether w ∈ Tt or w /∈ Tt the bicolored merging
will be different.
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case S1223 : w ∈ Tt.
Bicolored merging is done where all the vertices in Tt are given the color
A and rest of the vertices are assigned the color B.
case S2223 : w /∈ Tt.
w /∈ Tt implies that either w ∈ E2 or w ∈ Tq for some q( 6=) ∈ E2. In
any case do the bicolored merging where the color A is assigned to all the
vertices in
Tu
⋃
E1
⋃
TE1
⋃
Tw1
⋃
TE1
⋃
(E2 \ {w, q, w2})
⋃
(TE2 \ Tq)
and rest of the vertices are assigned the color B.
Now that we have exhausted all the cases and shown by clever method
of bicolored merging that the r-uniform entangled hypertree H1 can not be
LOCC converted to the r-uniform entangled hypertree H2, the same argu-
ments also work for showing that H2 can not be LOCC converted to H1 by
interchanging the roles of H1 and H2. Hence the theorem follows. ✷
Before ending our section on LOCC incomparability of multi-partite states
represented by EPR graphs and entangled hypergraphs we note that Bennett
et. al partial entropic criteria [BPRST00] which gives a sufficient condition
for LOCC incomparability of multi-partite states do not capture the LOCC-
incomparability of spanning EPR tree or spanning entangled hypertrees in
general. Consider two spanning EPR trees T1 and T2 on three vertices (say
1, 2, 3). T1 is such that the vertex pairs 1, 2 and 1, 3 are forming the two
edges where as in T2 the vertex pairs 1, 3 and 2, 3 are forming the two edges.
It is easy to see that T1 and T2 are not marginally isentropic.
3.7 Quantum Distance betweenMulti-partite
Entangled States
In the proof of theorem 17 we have utilized the fact that there exists at least
two vertices which are connected by an edge in T2 but not in T1 which follows
because T1 and T2 are different as well as they have equal number of edges
(namely n − 1 if there are n vertices). In fact, in general there may exist
several such pair of vertices depending on the structures of T1 and T2. Fortu-
nately there is some nicety in the number of such pair of vertices and it gives
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rise to a metric on the set of spanning (EPR) trees with fixed vertex set and
hence a concept of distance [Deo74]. The distance between any two spanning
(EPR) trees T1 and T2 denoted by QDT1,T2 on the same vertex set is defined
as the number of edges in T1 which are not in T2. Let us call this distance to
be the quantum distance between T1 and T2. Now that we have proved in the-
orem 17 obtaining T2 from T1 is not possible just through LOCC, we need to
do quantum communication. The minimum number of qubit communication
required for this purpose should be an interesting parameter related to state
transformations amongst multi-partite states represented by spanning EPR
trees ; let us denote this number by qT1,T2 . We can note that qT1,T2 ≤ QDT1,T2 .
This is because each edge not present in T2 can be created by only one qubit
communication. The exact value of qT1,T2 will depend on the structures of
T1 and T2 and , as we can note, on the number of edge disjoint paths in T1
between the vertex pairs which form an edge in T2 but not T1.
But this is not all about the quantum distance. Let us recall the theorem
16 where we prove that n − 1 is a lower bound on the number of copies of
n − CAT to prepare a spanning EPR tree by LOCC. Can we obtain some
lower bound like this in the case of two spanning EPR trees and relate it to
the quantum distance? Answer is indeed yes. Let CT1,T2 denote the minimum
number of copies of the spanning EPR tree T1 to obtain T2 just by LOCC.
We claim that 2 ≤ CT1,T2 , CT2,T1 ≤ QDT1,T2 + 1. The lower bound follows
from theorem 17. The upperbound is also true becasue of the following
reason. QDT1,T2 is the number of (EPR pairs) edges present in T2 but not in
T1. For each such edge in T2 if u, v are the vertices forming the edge, while
converting many copies of T1 to T2 by LOCC, an edge between u and v must
be created. Since T1 is a spanning tree and therefore connected , there must
be a path between u and v in T1 and this path can be well converted (using
entanglement swapping) to an edge between them ( i.e. EPR pair between
them) only using LOCC. Hence one copy each will suffice to create each such
edges in T2. Thus QDT1,T2 copies of T1 will be sufficient to create all such
QDT1,T2 edges in T2. One more copy will supply all the edges common in T1
and T2. Even more interesting point is that both these bounds are saturated.
This means to say that there do exist spanning EPR trees satifying these
bounds (Figure 3.7.18).
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3.8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 19: We first establish the following claim.
claim: ∃E1 ∈ F1, E2 ∈ F2 such that E1 6= E2, E1
⋂
E2 6= φ and E2 /∈
F1
⋂
F2.
P roof of the claim: We first show that on same vertex set, the number of
hyperedges in any r-uniform hypertree is always same. Let n and m be the
number of vertices and hyperedges in a r-uniform hypertree then we show
by induction on m that n = m ∗ (r − 1) + 1.
For m = 1, n = 1 ∗ (r − 1) + 1 = r which is true because all possible
vertices (since no one can be isolated) fall in the single edge and it has exactly
r vertices.
Let us assume that this relation between n and m for a fixed r holds for
all values of the induction variable up to m− 1 then we are to show that it
holds good for m.
Now take a r-uniform hypertree with m hyperedges. Remove any of the
hyperedges to get another hypergraph (which may not be connected) which
has only m− 1 edges. This removal may introduce k connected components
(sub-hypertrees) where 1 ≤ k ≤ r. Let these components has respectively
m1, m2, · · · , mk number of hyperedges. Therefore,
∑k
i=1mi = m − 1. Total
number of vertices in the new hypergraph (with the k sub-hypertrees as
components), n1 =
∑
ni where ni is the number of vertices in the component
i.
Therefore, n1 =
∑
ni =
∑k
i=1{mi(r − 1) + 1} = (m− 1)(r − 1) + k.
Now the number of vertices in the original hypertree, n = n1 + (r − k)
because k vertices were already covered, one each in the k components.
Therefore, n = (m − 1)(r − 1) + k + (r − k) = (m − 1)(r − 1) + r =
(m−1)(r−1)+ (r−1)+1 = m(r−1)+1. The result is thus true for m and
hence for any number of hyperedges by induction. This result implies that
any r-uniform hypertree on the same vertex set will always have the same
number of hyperedges.
Let F = F1
⋂
F2 and m = |F1| = |F2|. Obviously m > |F | otherwise
H1 = H2 implying that ∃E ∈ F2 such that E /∈ F .
Let U =
⋂
A∈F A is the vertex set on which the common hyperedges relies.
Depending on the characteristics of U we break the proof in two cases.
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CASE 1: ∃w ∈ E such that w /∈ U .
Since w /∈ U we get E /∈ F . Now since H1 is a hypertree w can not be an
isolated vertex and therefore there exists an edge say E1 ∈ F1 but E1 /∈ F
(otherwise w ∈ U). Take E2 = E and E1 = E1.
CASE 2: A ⊂ U∀A ∈ F2
We have |E| = r and E ⊂ U , say E = {e1, e2, · · · , er}.
No pair of (ei, ej) can be connected by the hyperedges only in F ( i.e.
through common hyperedges) otherwise ei (path in F ) ejEei will be a cycle
in H2 (mean to say that there will be two paths between ei and ej in H2
one in F and another one eiEEj both being in same hyperedge E) which is
absurd given that H2 is a hypertree.
Now H1 is a hypertree, therefore must be connected and there must be
a path between ei and ej in H1. Say this path be eiG1G2 · · ·Glej where
Gk ∈ F1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ l. Take E1 = G1 and E2 = E
Thus in all cases, we have proved that ∃E1 ∈ F1andE2 ∈ F2 such that
E1 6= E2, E1
⋂
E2 6= φ and E2 /∈ F1
⋂
F2 and hence follows our claim.
Now switch over to prove the theorem. Choose E1 and E2 so as to
satify the above claim. Let E1 = {u1, u2, · · · , ul, wl+1, wl+2, · · · , wr} and
E2 = {u1, u2, · · · , ul, vl+1, vl+2, · · · , vr}. Since E1
⋂
E2 6= φ , l ≥ 1 and
E1 6= E2 implies that l ≤ r− 1. Hence 1 ≤ l ≤ r. Now based on the value of
l we consider different cases below.
CASE 1 : l > 1
case 11: ∃vi such that u1 and vi are not in same hyperedge in H1.
Take u = u1 and v = vi in the statement of the theorem.
case 12: All vi are respectively in some hyperedges in H1 in which u1 also
lies.
None of these vi can belong to the same hyperedge as of u2 in H1. This
is because if say vj happen to be in same hyperedge as of u2 in H1 then
u1u2vju1 will be a cycle in H1 which is absurd as H1 is a hypertree. Note
that at least one such vi must exist as l < r.
Take u = u2 and v = any vi.
CASE 2: l = 1
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case 21: ∃vi such that u1 and vi are not in same hyperedge in H1.
Take u = u1 and v = vi.
case 22: All vi are respectively in some hyperedges in H1 in which u1 also
lies.
Since there are r − 1 vi in number and E2 /∈ F1
⋂
F2, these vi will be
distributed in at least two different hyperedges in H1 in which u1 also lies.
Therefore, ∃vi, vj such that they are in same hyperedge in H2 (namely in
E2)but in necessarily different edges in H1 otherwise (i.e. if they lie in the
same hyperedge in H1) u1vivju1 will be a cycle in H1 which is absurd as H1
is a hypertree. Also note that both vi and vj will exist as r ≥ 3.
Take u = vi and v = vj .
Thus we have proved the above thorem in all possible cases. ✷
We would like to point out that this very result might be some direct
implication of standard results in combinatorics however for sake of com-
pleteness we have proved it in our own way, moreover keeping in appendix
section!
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Chapter 4
Unconditionally Secure
Multipartite Quantum Key
Distribution
4.1 Introduction
With the growing use of the internet and other forms of electronic commu-
nication, the question of secure communication becomes one of considerable
importance. Modern cryptographic techniques, based on the availability of
ever increasing computational power, and the invention of public key cryp-
tography, provide practical solutions for information security in various sit-
uations. But invariably these techniques are only computationally– and not
unconditionally– secure, that is, they depend on the (unproven) hardness of
certain mathematical problems. As a result, it cannot be guaranteed that
future advances in computational power will not nullify their cryptographic
protection. Nevertheless, there does exist a form of encryption with uncon-
ditional security: the use of one-time key pads. These are strings of random
numbers added by the information sender to encode the message, to be sub-
tracted by the receiver to decode. Provided that the key material is truely
random and used only once, this system is unbreakable in the sense described
by Shannon in the 1940s [Shannon45]. It is critically important that the pad
is only used once, i.e., an encryption key can never be used twice. This re-
striction translates into the practical one of key distribution (KD). This need
to securely distribute the key between the users makes it impractical in many
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applications. Where it is used in real life (eg., in confidential communications
between governments), the one-time key pads are actually delivered in per-
son by some trusted third party, an arrangement prohibitively expensive for
common usage and moreover not truely secure. Fortunately, recent advances
in quantum information theory have shown that unconditionally secure key
distribution is possible in principle.
That quantum information can, on account of quantum uncertainty and
the no-cloning principle [WZ82], be used to distribute cryptographic keys
was realized two decades ago [BB84, Ekert91]. More rigorous and com-
prehensive proofs of this task, generally called quantum key distribution
(QKD), taking into consideration source, device and channel noise as well as
an arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper, have been studied by various authors
[May01, BBBMR00, LC99, IRV01, SP00]. Recently, the issues of efficiency
[HWMKL03], security in the presence of an uncharacterized source [KP03]
and high bit-error rate tolerance [Wang04] of QKD have been considered. In
particular, Lo and Chau [LC99] showed that, given fault-tolerant quantum
computers, quantum key distribution over an arbitrarily long distance of a
realistically noisy channel can be made unconditionally secure. This is a
heartening development, since QKD is, among quantum information appli-
cations, relatively easy to implement, and some large scale implementations
have already been achieved [GRTZ02, PGUWZ03]. The above mentioned
works consider QKD between two parties (ie., 2-QKD). It is of interest to
consider its extension to more than two parties (ie., n-QKD).
The problem of n-QKD is to determine how n parties, who are able to
communicate quantally, may share an identical and unconditionally secure,
secret key among themselves in the presence of eavesdroppers. (A different
generalization of 2-QKD gives multipartite quantum secret-sharing [SG01],
which we do not consider here). In this work, we propose a protocol for this
purpose and prove its unconditional security. We note that a simple extrap-
olation of 2-QKD to n-QKD would suggest that the agents should begin by
sharing an n-partite entangled state. However, this proposition suffers from
two drawbacks: from a practical viewpoint, preparing n-partite entanglement
is no easy task; from a theoretical viewpoint, proving the security of secure
extraction of n separated copies of a bit-string may not be simple, even given
the existing proof of security of the bipartite case. Our main result is that it is
sufficient if some pairs of agents share bipartite entanglement along any span-
ning tree connecting the n agents, who are taken to be vertices on a graph.
In this way, n-QKD is reduced to a 2-QKD problem. Existing 2-QKD proto-
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cols [May01, BBBMR00, LC99, IRV01, SP00, HWMKL03, KP03, Wang04]
can be invoked to prove the unconditional security of sharing nearly perfect
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs between two parties. They prescribe
procedures for reliably sharing EPR pairs, and thence sharing randomness,
by virtue of fault-tolerant quantum computers, quantum error correction and
suitable random sampling. In the interests of brevity, we will not elaborate
these protocols here, and only point them out as subroutines for the general
n-QKD task. Our protocol is fairly simple in the sense that the proof of its
security is built on top of the already proven security of the bipartite case.
However, it is important to know the necessary and sufficient conditions on
the network topology for our proposed protocol to work.
4.2 Classical Reduction of n-KD to 2-KD
As in 2-KD, the goal of n-KD is to show that n trustful parties can securely
share random, secret classical bits, even in the presence of noise and eaves-
dropping. It is assumed that the n agents can share authenticated classical
communication. It is convenient to treat the problem graph theoretically as
in Chapter 2. The n agents Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are considered as the vertices (or
nodes) of an undirected graph. An instance of a secure bi-partite channel be-
ing shared between two parties is considered as an undirected edge between
the two corresponding vertices. A graph so formed is called a security graph.
It is obvious that if the security graph has a star topology (a hub vertex with
all edges radiating from it to the other vertices), a simple n-KD protocol can
be established. The agent at the hub vertex (say, called, Lucy) generates a
random bit string and transmits it to every other agent along the edges to
each of them. This will create a secure, identical random bit string with each
agent.
In real life situations, because of practical and geographical constraints,
the n agents may not form a security graph with star topology. We describe
a simple protocol that allows for more general secure bi-partite connectivity
between the agents. In particular, from among the secure bipartite channels
suppose a spanning tree (a graph connecting all vertices without forming a
loop) can be constructed. This construction can be formalized in order to
determine an optimal spanning tree. Some useful definitions are given below.
Definition 10 Weighted security graph: Given n parties treated as nodes
on a graph, we extend the definition of a security graph to the weighted
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security graph. A weight is associated with every edge and is defined to be
some suitable measure of the cost of communicating by means of the channel
corresponding to the edge.
Definition 11 Minimum spanning security tree: Consider the weighted
security graph G = (V,E). A spanning tree selected from G, given by G1 =
(V,E1), E1 ⊆ E is called the minimum spanning security tree if it minimizes
the total weight of the graph.
Minimum spanning security tree need not be unique and can be obtained
using Kruskal’s or Prim’s algorithm [CLR90]. The minimum spanning secu-
rity tree minimizes the resources needed in the protocol as well as the size of
the sector eavesdroppers can potentially control.
Definition 12 Terminal agent: An agent that corresponds to a vertex of
degree one (ie., with exactly one edge linked to it). On the other hand, an
agent that corresponds to a vertex of degree greater than one is called a
non-terminal agent.
We now present a classical subroutine that allows n− 1 pair-wise shared
random bits to be turned into a single random bit shared between the n
parties.
1. 2-KD: Along the n − 1 edges of a minimum spanning security tree,
n− 1 random bits are securely shared by means of some secure 2-KD
protocol.
2. Each non-terminal agent Ai announces his unformly randomized record:
this is the list of edges emanating from the vertex along with the cor-
responding random bit values, to all of which a fixed random bit x(i)
is added.
3. This information is sufficient to allow every player, in conjunction with
her/his own random bit record, to reconstruct the random bits of all
parties. The protocol leader (say, Lucy) decides randomly on the ter-
minal agent whose random bit will serve as the secret bit shared among
the n agents.
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This subroutine consumes n− 1 pair-wise shared random numbers to give a
one-bit secret key shared amongst the n-parties. To generate an m-bit string
shared among the n agents, the subroutine is repeated m times.
Given that the initial bipartite sharing of randomness is secure, we will
show that the above protocol subroutine allows some randomness to be
shared between the n agents without revealing anything to an eavesdropper.
It involves each non-terminal agent announcing his uniformly randomized
record. Suppose one such, Ai, has the random record 0,1,1 on the three
edges linked to his vertex. He may announce 0,1,1 (for x(i) = 0) or 1,0,0
(for x(i) = 1). All the three agents linked to him can determine which the
correct string is by referring to their shared secret bit. It is a straightforward
exercise to see that each of other agents linked to these three can determine
the right bit string. Therefore, each agent can determine the random bits
of all others. Eavesdroppers, on the other hand, lacking knowledge of any
of the n − 1 shared random bits, can only work out the relative outcomes
of all parties. The result is exactly two possible configurations for each se-
cret bit, which are complements of each other. The eavesdropper “Eve” is
thus maximally uncertain about which the correct configuration is. Hence,
Lucy’s choice of a party to fix the secret bit reveals little to Eve. Insofar as
the n-parties are able to communicate authenticated classical messages, the
subroutine protocol is as secure as the underlying procedure for 2-KD.
It is obvious that the above protocol works for any spanning security tree.
Clearly, a sufficient condition for turning shared bipartite randomness into
randomness shared between n parties is that the weighted security graph
should contain at least one spanning tree. On the other hand, if the security
graph is disconnected, one easily checks that it is impossible to arrive at
a definite random bit securely shared between both the disconnected pieces.
Therefore, the existence of at least one spanning tree in the weighted security
graph is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the required task.
The amount of securely shared randomness may be quantified by the
length of shared random bit string multiplied by the number of sharing
agents. In the above protocol, the n − 1 instances of pair-wise shared ran-
domness is consumed to produce exactly one instance of a random bit shared
between the n parties. We can then define the ‘random efficiency’ of the
above protocol by η = (n×1)/((n−1)×2), which tends to (1/2) as n→∞.
Unconditional security of the above subroutine can in principle only be guar-
anteed in a protocol which includes in step 1 a quantum sub-routine that
implements 2-QKD. In the following Section, we will present one such, based
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on the Shor-Preskill protocols [SP00], as an example.
4.3 Quantum Protocol
As in 2-QKD, the goal of the proposed n-QKD protocol is to show that
n trustful parties can securely distil random, shared, secret classical bits,
whose security is to be proven inspite of source, device and channel noise
and of Eve, an eavesdropper assumed to be as powerful as possible, and
in particular, having control over all communication channels. From the
result of the preceding Section, it follows that a quantum protocol is needed
only in step 1 above. It will involve establishing 2-QKD along a minimum
spanning tree in order to securely share pair-wise randomness along spanning
tree’s edges and thence proceed to n-QKD. We assume as given the security
of establishing pair-wise randomness along a spanning tree by means of a
quantum communication network, based on a secure 2-QKD protocol [May01,
BBBMR00, LC99, SP00, IRV01, HWMKL03, KP03, Wang04]. In principle,
these protocols guarantee security under various circumstances.
In an n-QKD scheme, the insecurity of even one of the players can un-
dermine all. Hence additional classical processing like key reconciliation and
privacy amplification of the final key may be needed at the n-partite level. In
the full n-QKD protocol that we present below, following Ref. [SP00] we ex-
ploit the connection of error correction codes [MS77] with key reconciliation
and privacy amplification. These procedures have been extensively studied
by classical cryptographers [GRTZ02], and other possibilities exist.
In particular, we adopt a quantum protocol wherein pair-wise random-
ness is created by means of sharing EPR pairs (this follows the pattern set
by the Ekert [Ekert91], Lo-Chau [LC99] and Modified Lo-Chau [SP00] pro-
tocols, but entanglement is not necessary, as seen in the original BB84 pro-
tocol). The basic graph theoretic definitions introduced above apply also
for the quantum case, except that now the security channels correspond to
shared EPR pairs. In place of a secure bipartite channel, an instance of
EPR pair shared between two parties is considered as an undirected edge
between the two corresponding vertices. A graph so formed is called an EPR
graph (Chapter 2). The analog of the weighted security graph is the weighted
EPR graph, and that of the minimum spanning security tree is the minimum
spanning EPR tree. Let us enumerate the n parties as A1, A2, · · · , An. Sup-
pose that only Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Ais (i1, i2, · · · , is ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}) are capable of
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producing EPR pairs and S ≡ {Ai1, · · · , Ais} is the set of all such vertices,
with S 6= ∅. We construct a weighted undirected graph G = (V,E) as one
whose every edge must contain a vertex drawn from the set S, as follows:
V ≡ {Ai; i = 1, 2, · · · , n} and E ≡ {(Ai, Aj) ∀ Ai ∈ S and ∀ Aj ∈ V ; i 6= j}.
And the weight of edge (Ai, Aj) is defined to be wi,j ∝ number of quan-
tum repeaters [BDCZ98] (more generally: entanglement distilling resources
[DLCZ01]) required to be put between Ai and Aj. Usually, the larger the
distance between two agents, the larger is the weight. The minimum span-
ning EPR tree minimizes the number of quantum repeators needed, and, in
general, the resources needed in the protocol (EPR pairs, etc.) subject to
the constraint of available EPR sources. Apart from improving efficiency in
terms of costs incurred, this optimization is also important from the security
perspective in that it minimizes the size of the sector that Eve can potentially
control.
Let C be a classical t-error correcting [m, k]-code [MS77]. We now present
a protocol that consumes n−1 pair-wise securely shared sets of EPR pairs to
create random bits shared between the n parties with asymptotic efficiency
η = (1/2)k/m, where k/m is the rate of the code. The classical subroutine
described in the previous Section is adapted to include key reconciliation
and privacy amplification at the n-partite level, that uses the group theoretic
properties of C.
1. EPR protocol: Along the n − 1 edges of the minimum spanning EPR
tree, EPR pairs are shared (using eg., the Lo-Chau [LC99] or Mod-
ified Lo-Chau protocols [SP00]). Let the final, minimum number of
EPR pairs distilled along any edge of the minimum spanning EPR
tree be 2m. A projective measurement in the computational basis is
performed by all the parties on their respective qubits to obtain se-
cure pair-wise shared randomness along the tree edges (making due
adjustments according to whether the entangled spins are correlated or
anti-correlated).
2. Classical subroutine of Section 4.2: All non-terminal vertices announce
their unformly randomized outcome record. This information in prin-
ciple allows every party, in conjunction with her/his outcome, to re-
construct the outcomes of all other parties, save for some errors of
mismatch.
3. For each set of n − 1 shared EPR pairs, protocol leader Lucy decides
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randomly on the terminal party whose outcome will serve as the secret
bit.
4. Lucy decides randomly a set of m bits to be used as check bits, and
announces their positions.
5. All parties announce the value of their check bits. If too few of these
values agree, they abort the protocol.
6. Lucy broadcasts ci⊕v, where v is the string consisting of the remaining
code (non-check) bits, and ci is a random codeword in C.
7. Each member j from amongst the remaining n − 1 parties subtracts
ci⊕v from his respective code bits, v⊕ǫj , and corrects the result, ci⊕ǫj ,
to a codeword in C. Here ǫj is a possibly non-vanishing error-vector.
8. The parties use i as the key.
A rigorous proof of the security of the n-QKD scheme requires: (a) the
explicit construction of a procedure such that whenever Eve’s strategy has
a non-negligible probability of passing the verification test by the n parties,
her information on the final key will be exponentially small. (b) the shared,
secret randomness is robust against source, device and channel noise. By
construction, our scheme combines a 2-QKD scheme to generate pair-wise
shared randomness and a classical scheme to turn this into multipartite-
shared randomness. The security of the latter (in its essential form) was
proven in Section 4.2. Therefore the security of the protocol with respect to
(a) and (b) reduces to that of the 2-QKD in step 1. For various situations,
2-QKD can be secured, as proven in Refs [May01, BBBMR00, LC99, IRV01,
SP00]. For example, Lo and Chau [LC99] and Shor and Preskill [SP00] have
proved that EPR pairs can be prepared to be nearly perfect, even in the
presence of Eve and channel noise. Their proofs essentially relies on the idea
that sampling the coherence of the qubits allows one to place an upper bound
on the effects due to noise and information leakage to Eve. Yet, subject to
the availability of high quality quantum repeaters and fault-tolerant quantum
computation, in principle 2-QKD can be made unconditionally secure [LC99].
In regard to the key reconciliation part: in step (3), each non-terminal
vertex party announces his uniformly randomized outcome record. Here this
consumes m instances of n− 1 pair-wise shared random bits into k random
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bits shared between the n agents while revealing little to Eve. The ran-
dom efficiency is given by η = (k × n× 1)/(m× (n− 1)× 2), which tends
to (1/2)k/m as n → ∞. The check bits, whose positions and values are
announced in steps (4) and (5), are eventually discarded. Steps (7) and (8)
involve purely local, classical operations. If security of step (1) against Eve
is guaranteed, the string v, and thereby the string ci⊕ v announced by Lucy
in step (6), are completely random, as far as Eve can say. So, she (Eve) gains
nothing therefrom. Hence her mutual information with any of the n−1 (sets
of) random bits does not increase beyond what she has at the end of the
EPR protocol.
Finally, step (5) permits with high probability to determine whether the
key can be reconciled amongst the n players. The check bits that the parties
measure behave like a classical random sample of bits [SP00]. We can then
use the measured error rates in a classical probability estimate. For any two
parties, the probability of obtaining more than (δ + ǫ)n errors on the code
bits and fewer than δn errors on the check bits is asymptotically less than
exp[−0.25ǫ2n/(δ− δ2)]. Noting that the errors on the n check vectors are in-
dependent, it follows that probability that the check vectors are all scattered
within a ball of radius δn but one or more code vectors fall outside a scatter
ball of radius (δ + ǫ)n is exponentially small, and can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing sufficiently small δ. The decision criterion adopted in step
(5) is calculated so that the Hamming weight of the error vectors ǫj esti-
mated in the above fashion will be less than t with high probability. Hence
all parties correct their results to the same codeword ci in step (8) with high
probability. This completes the proof of unconditionally security of n-QKD.
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Chapter 5
Generalized Quantum Secret
Sharing
5.1 Introduction
Suppose the president of a bank, Alice, wants to give access to a vault to two
vice-presidents, Bob and Charlie, whom she does not entirely trust. Instead
of giving the combination to any one of them, she may desire to distribute
the information in such a way that no vice-president alone has any knowledge
of the combination, but both of them can jointly determine the combination.
Cryptography provides the answer to this question in the form of secret shar-
ing [Sch96, Grus97]. In this scheme, some sensitive data is distributed among
a number of parties such that certain authorized sets of parties can access
the data, but no other combination of players. A particularly symmetric
variety of secret splitting (sharing) is called a threshold scheme: in a (k, n)
classical threshold scheme (CTS), the secret is split up into n pieces (shares),
of which any k shares form a set authorized to reconstruct the secret, while
any set of k− 1 or fewer shares has no information about the secret. Blakely
[Blakeley79] and Shamir [Shamir79] showed that CTS’s exist for all values of
k and n with n ≥ k. By concatenating threshold schemes, one can construct
arbitrary access structures, subject only to the condition of monotony (ie.,
sets containing authorized sets should also be authorized) [BL90]. Hillery et
al. [HBB99] and Karlsson et al. [KKI99] proposed methods for implement-
ing CTSs that use quantum information to transmit shares securely in the
presence of eavesdroppers.
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Subsequently, extending the above idea to the quantum case, Cleve,
Gottesman and Lo [CGL99] proposed a (k, n) quantum threshold scheme
(QTS) as a method to split up an unknown secret quantum state |S〉 into
n pieces (shares) with the restriction that k > n/2 (for if this inequality
were violated, two disjoint sets of players can reconstruct the secret, in vi-
olation of the quantum no-cloning theorem [WZ82]). The notion of QTS
is based on quantum erasure correction [CS96, GBP97]. QSS has been ex-
tended beyond QTS to general access structures [Got99, Smi00], but here
the no-cloning theorem implies that none of the authorized sets shall be mu-
tually disjoint. Potential applications of QSS include creating joint checking
accounts containing quantum money [Wis83], or share hard-to-create ancilla
states [Got99], or perform secure distributed quantum computation [CGS02].
In conventional QSS schemes, it is often implicitly assumed that all share-
holders carry quantum information. Sometimes it is possible to construct
an equivalent scheme in which some share holders carry only classical in-
formation and no quantum information [NMI01]. Such a hybrid (classical-
quantum) QSS that combines classical and quantum secret sharing brings a
significant improvement to the implementation of QSS, inasmuch as quantum
information is much more fragile than classical information. Moreover, hy-
brid QSS can potentially avail of features available to classical secret sharing
such as share renewal [HJKY96], secret sharing with prevention [Belt90] and
disenrolment [Mar93]. The essential method to hybridize QSS is to some-
how incorporate classical information that is needed to decrypt or prepare
the quantum secret as classical shares. A simple instance of such classical
information is the ordering information of the shares. In QTS, it is implicity
assumed that the share-holders know the the coordinates of the shares in the
secret, i.e., they know who is holding the first qubit, who the second and so
on. This ordering information is necessary to reconstruct the secret, without
which successful reconstruction of the secret is not guaranteed. If we wish to
make use of this ordering information in the above sense, then only quantum
error correction based secret sharing where lack of ordering information leads
to maximal ignorance can be used. In particular, the scheme should be sen-
sitive to the interchange of two or more qubits. For example, let us consider
a (2, 3)-QTS. The secret here is an arbitrary qutrit and the encoding maps
the secret qutrit to three qutrits as:
α|0〉+β|1〉+γ|2〉 7−→ α(|000〉+|111〉+|222〉)+β(|012〉+|120〉+|201〉)+γ(|021〉+|210〉+|102〉),
(5.1)
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and each qutrit is taken as a share. While from a single share no infor-
mation can be obtained, two shares, with ordering information, suffice to
reconstruct the encoded state [CGL99]. However, the lack of ordering infor-
mation does not always lead to maximal ignorace about the secret. Note that
the structure of the above code is such that any interachange of two qubits
leaves an encoded |0〉 intact but interchanges |1〉 and |2〉. Thus, a secret like
|0〉 or (1/√2)(|1〉 + |2〉) can be entirely reconstructed without the ordering
information. Therefore, only the subset of quantum error correction codes
admissible in QSS that do not possess such symmetry properties can be used
if the scheme is to be sensitive to ordering information.
Theoretically simpler but practically somewhat more difficult is an in-
teresting idea proposed by Nascimento et al. [NMI01], based on qubit en-
cryption [MTW00]. In Sections 5.2 and 5.4, we adopt this method to gener-
ate the relevant encrypting classical information. However, in principle any
classical data whose suppression leads to maximal ignorance of the secret
is also good. Elsewhere, in Section 5.5, we consider another way. Quan-
tum encryption works as follows: suppose we have a n-qubit quantum state
|ψ〉 and random sequence K of 2n classical bits. Each sequential pair of
classical bit is associated with a qubit and determines which transforma-
tion σˆ ∈ {Iˆ, σˆx, σˆy, σˆz} is applied to the respective qubit. If the pair is
00, Iˆ is applied, if it is 01, σˆx is applied, and so on. The resulting |ψ˜〉 is
a complete mixture and no information can be extracted out of it because
the encryption leaves any pure state in a maximally mixed state, that is:
(1/4)(Iˆ|S〉〈S|Iˆ + σˆx|S〉〈S|σˆx+ σˆy|S〉〈S|σˆy + σˆz|S〉〈S|σˆz) = (1/2)Iˆ. However,
with knowledge of K the sequence of operations can be reversed and |ψ〉
recovered. Therefore, classical data can be used to encrypt quantum data.
In analogy with classical secret sharing, it is customary to consider that
all quantum shares must be distributed among the players. A simple gener-
alization (which we call ‘assisted QSS’ schemes), that is helpful from both
theoretical and practical considerations, is to allow some shares to remain
with the share dealer. This simple device will, rather surprisingly, enable
us to implement QSS schemes in which authorized sets may be mutually
disjoint. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we study such assisted schemes.
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5.2 Inflating Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
In hybrid QSS, the quantum secret is split up into quantum and classical
shares of information. We call the former q-shares, and the latter c-shares.
A player holding only c-shares is called a c-player or c-member. Otherwise,
she or he is a q-player or q-member.
Definition 13 AQSS scheme realizing an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr}
among a set of players P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} is said to be compressible if fewer
than n q-shares are sufficient to implement it.
Here the αi’s are the minimal authorized sets of players. Knowledge of com-
pressibility helps us decide how to minimize quantum resources needed for
implementing a given QSS scheme. As an example of compression by means
of hybrid QSS, suppose we want to split a quantum secret |S〉 among a
set of players P = {A,B,C,D,E, F} realizing the access structure Γ =
{ABC,AD,AEF}. That is, the only sets authorized to reconstruct the se-
cret are {A,B,C}, {A,D} and {A,E, F} and sets containing them, whilst
any other set is unauthorized to do so. For distributing the secret, we encrypt
|S〉 using the quantum encryption method (described above) with classical
key K into a new state |S˜〉 and give |S˜〉 to A. We then split up K using a
CSS scheme that realizes Γ. Player A cannot recover |S〉 from |S˜〉 because he
cannot unscramble it without K. Only the αj ’s, and sets containing them,
can recover the classical key K, and thence decrypted secret state. In this
way, by means of a hybrid (classical-quantum) secret-sharing scheme, we
can compress the original QSS scheme into an equivalent one in which fewer
players need to handle quantum information.
The question, how to augment or “inflate” a given QSS scheme keeping
the quantum component fixed, is considered herebelow. This is of practical
relevance if we wish to expand a given QSS scheme by including new players
who do not have (reliable) quantum information processing capacity. To this
end, we now define an inflatable QSS.
Definition 14 AQSS(Γ) scheme realizing an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr}
among a set of players P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} using a total of m q-shares is
inflatable if n can be increased for fixed m to form a new QSS(Γ′) such that
Γ′|P = Γ, where Γ′|P denotes the restriction of Γ′ to P.
Clearly, inflation involves the addition of classical information carrying c-
players. The additional shares required for them will be c-shares, so that
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q-shares may remain fixed at m. The following theorem answers the question
when a QSS scheme can be inflated.
Theorem 21 AQSS scheme realizing an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr}
among a set of players P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} using a total of m q-shares can
always be inflated.
Proof. Consider the addition of a single player, Pn+1. The new set of players
are P ′ ≡ {P1, P2, · · · , Pn+1}. A new access structure Γ′ can be obtained by
arbitrarily adding Pn+1 to any of the αj ’s. Clearly, Γ
′ will not violate the
no-cloning theorem [WZ82], since Γ does not. As a result, the augmented
scheme can be realized as a conventional QSS scheme using (say) m′ > m q-
shares. Therefore, by construction, there is one Pi (namely, that for i = n+1
in the above case) such that Γ′|P ′−Pi does not violate the no-cloning theorem,
where Γ′|P ′−Pi denotes the restriction of Γ′ to P ′ − Pi. Therefore, according
to Theorem 1 of Ref. [NMI01], the new QSS scheme obtained by adding
Pn+1 is compressible, meaning that Pn+1 can be a c-player. Therefore, the
new scheme QSS(Γ′) is an inflation of the given scheme QSS(Γ). It is clear
that the process of addition of new c-players can be continued indefinitely
without restriction. ✷
The above theorem only says that that any QSS scheme can be inflated in
some way. A specific problem is whether a given (k, n)-QTS can be inflated.
This is considered in the following two theorems.
Theorem 22 A (k, n)-QTS cannot be inflated at constant threshold.
Proof. Suppose (k, n)-QTS can be inflated at constant threshold. Then
there exists a (k, n′)-QTS, consistent with the no-cloning theorem and with
n′ > n, whose restriction leads to (k, n)-QTS. Let n′−n ≡ γ. The restriction
of (k, n′)-QTS by γ players will lead to a (k − γ, n)-QTS [NMI01], whose
access structure is different from (k, n)-QTS. This contradicts our original
assumption. ✷
Theorem 23 A (k, n)-QTS can be inflated conformally, ie., to newer thresh-
old schemes having the form (k + γ, n+ γ), for any positive integer γ.
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Proof. If the given (k, n)-QTS satisfies the no-cloning theorem, then clearly
so will the (k+γ, n+γ)-QTS. Further, according to Lemma 1 of Ref. [NMI01],
a restriction of the (k + γ, n + γ)-QTS by γ players yields a (k, n)-QTS.
Therefore, an expansion of a (k, n)-QTS to a (k + γ, n+ γ)-QTS is possible
adding only (γ) c-players. ✷
5.3 Assisted Quantum Secret Sharing
Because of the no-cloning theorem, secret sharing requires q-shares being
converged to some site in order to reconstruct the secret, which could be
the secret dealer or some designated reconstructor for final processing. For
example, in the first example, access is allowed by the vault (which can be
thought of as the dealer) if the secret reconstructed from the vice-presidents’
shares is the required password. In this case, by definition, the secret dealer
is a trusted party in the secret sharing. In such cases, there appears to be
little loss of generality in leaving some shares obtained from splitting the
secret with the dealer, the other shares being shared among the players, each
of whom receives at least one share. Where the dealer may be distinct from
the reconstructor, as in multiparty secure computation, the dealer transmits
his shares to the latter, once the latter is identified. When shares of an
authorized set converge at the reconstructor, the latter simply adds his own
shares before processing the verification. In practice, the dealer can simply
be a computer program that stores passwords of bank accounts or a central
quantum computer in a multi-party secure computation procedure. We refer
to this generalization of quantum secret sharing as ‘assisted quantum secret
sharing’ (AQSS).
In classical secret sharing, such “share assistance” (from the dealer) does
not appear to offer any new advantage. However, the situation is quite dif-
ferent in QSS. First, as we point out below, the only restriction on the access
structure Γ in AQSS is monotony. The members of Γ are not required to
have mutual overlaps, in order to satisfy the no-cloning theorem. Further, as
we show later, it can considerably reduce the amount of quantum commu-
nication and the number of quantum information carrying players required
in a QSS, in ways clarified below. This is quite important from the view-
point of implementation, considering that quantum information processing
is extremely difficult. Shares which are dealt out to players are called ‘player
86
shares’; that/those which remain(s) back with the dealer (to be transmitted
to the reconstructor directly, if necessary) is/are called ‘resident share(s)’. A
conventional QSS scheme is a special cases of the assisted scheme, in which
the set of resident shares is empty. We note that share assistance is needed
only when the members of an access structure do not have pairwise overlap.
Theorem 24 Given an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} among a set
of players P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn}, an assisted quantum secret sharing scheme
exists iff Γ is monotone.
Proof: It is known that if the members of Γ all overlap, then there ex-
ists a conventional QSS to realize it [Got99]. Suppose the members of Γ do
not overlap. (It is instructive to look at the classical situation. Suppose Γ =
{ABC,DE}, which can be written in the normal form {(AAND B ANDC) OR (D AND E)}.
The AND gate corresponds to a (|αj |, |αj|) threshold scheme, while OR to
a (1,2) threshold scheme. By concatenating these two layers, we get a con-
struction for Γ.) In the conventional QSS, the above fails for two reasons,
because by the no-cloning theorem: the members of Γ should not be disjoint
and further there is no ((1, 2)) scheme (here, following Ref. [Got99], double
(single) brackets denote the quantum (classical) scheme.) However, we re-
place ((1, 2)) by a ((2, 3)) scheme, which corresponds to a majority function
of OR. In general, we replace a ((1, r)) scheme by a ((r, 2r−1)) scheme. r of
the shares correspond to individual authorized sets in Γ, and the other r− 1
shares will remain as resident shares with the dealer. Any authorized set,
by combining its second layer (AND) shares can reconstruct its first layer
(OR) share, which, combined with the resident share, can reconstruct the
secret. Since the necessity of the resident share by itself fulfils the no-cloning
theorem, authorized sets are not required to be mutually overlapping. ✷
Another way to view this is that given any arbitrary Γ, including disjoint
members, we systematically add the same player to all authorized sets to
obtain a new Γ′ which is compatible with the no-cloning theorem in the
usual sense. Thus, we can turn Γ = {ABC,DE} into Γ′ = {ABCX,DEX},
by adding member X , whose share is the resident share deposited with the
dealer. Thereby, the structure Γ = Γ′|X , which denotes a restriction of Γ′ to
members other than X , is effectively realized among the players (excluding
the dealer).
For example, for the access structure Γ = {ABC,DE}, in the first layer,
a ((2, 3)) scheme is employed to split |S〉 into three shares, with one share
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designated to ABC and the other to DE. The last remains with the dealer
(cf. Eq. (5.2). In the second layer, the first two block rows are ((|αj|, |αj|))
schemes.
((2, 3))


((3, 3)) : A,B,C
((2, 2)) : D,E
((1, 1)) : dealer
(5.2)
In contrast, without share assistance, the share corresponding to the last
block would, recursively, be split according to a maximal scheme containing
Γ (which should of course not contain any disjoint members), for which a pure
state scheme exists [Got99]. Note that either ABC or DE can reconstruct
only one of the ((2,3)) shares. Thus the disjointness of these sets does not
violate the no-cloning theorem. When the share from an individual autho-
rized set is submitted, the secret can be reconstructed at the reconstructor
station, when combined with the resident share.
Theorem 25 For a ((k, n)) scheme, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, there exists an equiva-
lent assisted quantum threshold scheme. If k ≤ n/2, the equivalent assisted
scheme is given by ((k + γ, n+ γ)), where γ = n− 2k + 1.
Proof: If k > n/2, then the theorem stands proved by the known result
[CGL99] that a quantum erasure code exists equivalent to a ((k, n)) scheme.
Suppose that k ≤ n/2. Consider a ((k + γ, n + γ)) scheme, where γ is
increased until the no-cloning condition 2(k + γ) > n+ γ is met, which is at
γ = n− 2k+1. The dealer employs this scheme, retains γ shares as resident
shares, giving one of the remaining n shares to each player. Any k player
shares, combined with the resident share, suffice to reconstruct the secret.
Hence this method effectively realizes the required ((k, n)) scheme over the
players. ✷
Once again we note that there is no contradiction with the non-cloning
theorem because the procedure basically realizes a ((k+ γ, n+ γ)) scheme in
which the γ shares with the dealer forms a common element in all authorized
sets. As an example, suppose a ((2, 10)) assisted scheme is required. From
Theorem 25 we find γ = 7, so that the required assisted version is a ((9, 17))
scheme, which can be realized as a quantum erasure code. Of these, γ = 7
shares are resident shares, the remaining ten each being given to a player.
Any two players can reconstruct the secret by submitting their two shares
jointly to the reconstructor, which adds its seven shares to reconstruct the
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secret. Consider an access structure Γ = {ABC,AD,EFG}. The associ-
ated assisted structure is Γ′ = {ABCX,ADX,EFGX}, where share X is
designated to be a resident share. A q-share q is ‘important’ if there is an
unauthorized set T such that T ∪{q} is authorized. The size of an important
share of a conventional QSS that realizes Γ′ cannot be smaller than the di-
mension of the secret [Got99, IMNTW03]. Generalizing this argument gives
the following easy theorem.
Theorem 26 The dimension of each important share of an assisted quan-
tum secret sharing scheme must be at least as large as the dimension of the
secret.
5.4 Compressing Assisted Quantum Secret Shar-
ing Schemes
In a conventional ((k, n)) scheme, a compression of shares is possible only
if 2k > n + 1 [NMI01], in which case, the scheme can be compressed into a
((k−γ, n−γ)) scheme combined with a (k, n) scheme. A general access struc-
ture Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} can be realized by a first layer of (1, r)-threshold
scheme. In the quantum case, since this violates the no-cloning theorem, it
is replaced by the majority function (r, 2r − 1)-QTS [Got99]. This, again,
is incompressible. However, in the second layer of the construction, the
((|αi|, |αi|)) schemes can be replaced with a ((1, 1)) schemes combined with
(|αi|, |αi|) schemes. As seen from the results below, further saving on q-
players and q-shares becomes possible under share assistance. Here compres-
sion refers to the player shares and not the resident shares. Note that there is
a trivial compression for a share assisted scheme realizing an access structure
Γ, in which the entire secret simply remains with the dealer, and only the
encryption information is split-shared according to a classical scheme realiz-
ing Γ. This is ruled out by requiring that every αi must have at least one
important q-share allocated to it.
Theorem 27 A conventional QSS scheme realizing an access structure Γ =
{α1, α2, · · · , αr} among a set of players P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} can always be
compressed to an assisted QSS scheme requiring no more than M ≡ |M(Γ)|
quantum players, where M(Γ) is the smallest hitting set for the collection
Γ. Further compression is impossible.
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Proof. A ‘hitting set’ S(Γ) for the collection of sets Γ is a set of players
such that S ∩ αi 6= ∅ ∀ i (1 ≤ i ≤ r). Let M(Γ) be the smallest hitting set
for Γ. M(Γ) may or may not be unique. Having found M(Γ), designate its
members to be q-players and all others as c-players. This guarantees that
there is at least one q-player in each αj (which is necessary in a quantum
scheme). In the first layer of QSS, a ((M, 2M−1)) majority function scheme
is used to divide |S〉 into 2M − 1 shares. M of these shares are encrypted
using keys Ki (1 ≤ i ≤M) and given one per q-member. The respective keys
are shared classically using a (|αj|, |αj|) scheme in each authorized set. The
remaining M − 1 are retained by the dealer as resident shares. Together the
players of any αj can reconstruct Kj . This is used to decrypt the q-share(s)
of q-player(s) in αj . The decrypted share, in conjunction with the resident
shares, suffices to reconstruct the secret. This proves that M members,
provided they belong to M(Γ), are sufficient to effectively enact the QSS.
However, no further compression is possible. For, if we have fewer than M
q-players, then there is at least one αj with no q-player in it, which would
render reconstruction of the quantum secret impossible for that member of
Γ. ✷
The signifiance of the theorem lies in saving quantum communication and
minimizing q-players, which are required to be only M ≤ n in number. Let
us consider Theorem 27 applied to the access structure Γ = {ABC,DE},
the example considered in Eq. (5.2). The two authorized sets are disjoint,
so M = 2. We choose M = {A,D}, who are the two required q-players
(instead of five q-players, required in the uncompressed version). The first
layer will employ a (2, 3)-QTS to split |S〉. One share is encrypted using
K1 and given to A, another using K2 and given to D. K1 is shared using a
classical (3, 3) scheme among ABC, and K2 using a (2, 2) scheme among DE.
The remaining share remains resident at the dealer. This is depicted in Eq.
(5.3). The authorized set on any row suffices to unscramble and reconstruct
one first layer share, which in conjunction with the resident share permits
reconstruction of the whole secret.
((2, 3))


A → (3, 3) : A,B,C
D → (2, 2) : D,E
dealer
(5.3)
If some αj ’s have a common element, as for example in Γ = {ABC,DE,AFG},
then some q-players are chosen to belong to more than one authorized set;
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in this case, eg., M = {A,D} or M = {A,E}. If all members of Γ happen
to have one or more common players, then only one q-share is needed, given
to one of the common players, and no share assistance is required, as in the
case of Γ = {ABC,AD,AEF} that we encountered earlier. For a general
access structure involving a large number of players, computingM is a prov-
ably hard problem (Infact its decision version is shown to be NP-Complete
[GJ79]). Nevertheless, a particularly simple case is the symmetric one of a
threshold scheme.
Theorem 28 An assisted ((k, n)) scheme, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, can be maxi-
mally compressed to one requiring no more than n− k+1 quantum players.
Proof: If k > n/2, we retain the scheme as such, but if k ≤ n/2, we
replace the ((k, n)) scheme by ((k + γ, n + γ)) scheme, where by Theorem
25, γ = n − 2k + 1 and γ shares are resident at the dealer. In either case,
the requirement that any authorized set should have a q-share implies that
any set of k players must have at least one q-player. This is possible only if
M ≥ n−k+1. Minimally,M can be chosen to be any n−k+1 players, who
are designated as q-players. Thus, a further n−(n−k+1) = k−1 shares are
designated to remain with the dealer, bringing a total of γ + k − 1 resident
shares. The remaining n− k + 1 shares are encrypted and given one each to
n − k + 1 q-players. The encryption key is shared among the players using
a (k, n) scheme. Any k players will have at least one q-share among them,
which they can decrypt and transmit to the reconstructor. This will suffice
to reconstruct the secret using the ((k+γ, n+γ)) scheme. If a set of k players
has y (> 1) q-shares among them, then reconstruction can proceed in any of
2y ways, by transmitting any subset of the y shares to the reconstructor. ✷
For example, we return to the earlier example to realize a ((2, 10)) assisted
scheme via a ((9, 17)) scheme. The uncompressed version requires 7 resident
shares and 10 q-players. In the compressed scheme, only 10 − 2 + 1 = 9 q-
players are required, with 17− 9 = 8 resident shares. The q-shares with the
players are encrypted using a classical (2, 10) scheme. Now, a ((k, 2k − 1))
is incompressible without assistance [NMI01]. Theorem 28 implies that with
assistance it can be further compressed to one involving only k q-shares
(rather than 2k − 1 q-shares) among the players. For example suppose a
((2, 3)) scheme is to be realized among players A,B,C. The authorized
sets are {AB,BC,AC}. Going by Theorem 28, we require only 2 q-players,
i.e., any 2 players fully construct M. Let them be A,B. C remains a c-
player. The dealer D encrypts the secret |S〉 using data K and then splits
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the encrypted secret |S ′〉 according to ((2, 3)). He gives one of the resulting
three shares to A, another to B, retaining the third himself. Then he split-
shares K according to a (2, 3) scheme. Any two members can reconstruct
the secret by submitting the reconstructed K and taking share assistance
of one q-share from the dealer, if necessary. No fewer than two players can
reconstruct the secret. As members of M, A and B do not require share
assistance, but the other two combinations do.
5.5 Twin-threshold Quantum Secret Sharing
Schemes
In a conventional or compressed (k, n)-QTS, the threshold k applies to all
members taken together. Now suppose that we have separate thresholds for
c-members and q-members, namely kc and kq, with k = kc + kq. We now
extend the definition of a conventional QTS to a (kc, kq, n) quantum twin-
threshold scheme (Q2TS) and a (kc, kq, n,C) quantum twin-threshold scheme
with common set (Q2TS+C), where a quantum secret |S〉 is split into n pieces
(shares) according to some pre-agreed procedure and distributed among n
players. These n share-holders consist of members of set Q of q-players and
set Q¯ of c-players. We denote q ≡ |Q|, so that |Q¯| = n− q. Obviously, in a
quantum scheme, Q 6= ∅.
Definition 15 AQSS scheme is a (kc, kq, n) quantum twin-threshold scheme
(Q2TS) among n players, of which q are q-players and the remaining are c-
players, if at least kc c-players and at least kq q-players are necessary to
reconstruct the secret.
Definition 16 A QSS scheme is a (kc, kq, n,C) quantum twin-threshold
scheme with common set (Q2TS+C) among n players, of which q are q-
players and the remaining are c-players, if: (a) at least kc c-players and at
least kq q-players are necessary to reconstruct the secret; (b) All members of
the set C are necessary to reconstruct the secret.
The idea behind distinguishing between the classical threshold kc and the
quantum threshold kq is to obtain a simple generalization that combines the
properties of the CTS and QTS. Practically speaking, it is best to minimize
kq, at fixed k. However, one can in principle consider situations of potential
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use for a twin-threshold scheme, when a sufficiently large number of members
are able to process quantum information safely. Further, some of the share-
holders, while not entirely trust-worthy, may yet be more trust-worthy than
others. The share-dealer (say Alice) may prefer to include all such share-
holders during any reconstruction of the secret. This is the requirement that
motivates the introduction of set C. In general, C can contain members
drawn from Q and/or Q¯ or may be a null set. By definition, Q2TS+C with
C = ∅ is Q2TS.
In the following sections we present two methods to realize in varying
degrees the generalized quantum secret splitting scheme. The first of these
is the general version of Q2TS+C. The second, while more restricted, is
interesting because it is not directly based on quantum erasure correction, but
on information dilution via homogenization, in contrast to current proposals
of QSS.
5.5.1 Quantum Error Correction and Quantum En-
cryption
We now give protocols that realizes the twin-threshold scheme based on quan-
tum encryption.
Scheme 1. Protocol to realize (kc, kq, n)-Q2TS.
Distribution phase. (1) Choose a random classical encryption K. Encrypt
the quantum secret |S〉 using the encryption algorithm described in Section
5.1. The encrypted state is denoted |S˜〉; (2) Using a conventional (kq, q)-
QTS, split-share |S˜〉 among the members of Q; to not violate no-cloning, q
should satisfy kq > (q/2); (3) Using a (kc, n− q)-CTS, split-share K among
the members of Q¯.
Reconstruction phase. (1) Collect any kq q-shares from members of Q and
reconstruct |S˜〉; (2) Collect any kc shares from members of Q¯ and reconstruct
K; (3) Reconstruct |S〉 using |S˜〉 and K.
Now consider the case C 6= ∅ and the Q2TS scheme becomes the more
general Q2TS+C scheme. We now give a protocol that realizes this more
general twin-threshold scheme. We denote λq ≡ |Q ∩ C| and λc ≡ |Q¯ ∩ C|.
Clearly, λc+ λq = |C|. If there are no q-players in C, set λq = 0, and if there
are no c-players in C, set λc = 0. Note that by definition, q-players may also
carry classical information, but c-players don’t carry quantum information.
Scheme 2. Protocol to realize (kc, kq, n,C)-Q2TS+C.
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Distribution phase. (1) Choose a random classical encryption K. Encrypt
the quantum secret |S〉 using the encryption algorithm described in Section
5.1. The encrypted state is denoted |S˜〉; (2) Using a (2, 2)-QTS, divide |S˜〉
into two pieces, say |S˜1〉 and |S˜2〉; (3) Using a (λq, λq)-QTS, split |S˜1〉 among
the q-members in C; (4) Using a conventional (kq−λq, q−λq)-QTS, split |S˜2〉
among the q-members not in C; to not violate no-cloning, q should satisfy
(kq − λq) > (q− λq)/2; (5) Using a (2,2)-CTS, divide K into two shares, say
K1 and K2; (6) Part K1 is split among the members of C using a (|C|, |C|)-
CTS. Alternatively, it can be split using a (λc, λc)-CTS among the c-players
in C; (7) Using a (kc − λc, n− q − λc)-CTS, split K2 among the members of
Q¯− C.
Reconstruction phase. (1) Collect all λq shares from all members of Q ∩
C and reconstruct |S˜1〉; (2) Collect any kq − λq q-shares from Q − C to
reconstruct |S˜2〉; (3) Combining |S˜1〉 and |S˜2〉, reconstruct |S˜〉; (4) Collect
all |C| c-shares from members of C and reconstruct K1. Alternatively, collect
all λc c-shares from members of Q¯ ∩ C and reconstruct K1; (5) Collect any
kc − λc shares from Q¯ − C and reconstruct K2; (6) Combining K1 and K2,
reconstruct K. (7) Reconstruct |S〉 using |S˜〉 and K.
5.5.2 Quantum Twin-threshold Scheme Based on In-
formation Dilution via Homogenization
The second, more restrictive scheme, is based on the procedure for infor-
mation dilution in a system-reservoir interaction, proposed by Ziman et al.
[ZSBHSG02]. The novelty of the scheme lies in the fact that it is not di-
rectly based on an quantum error-correction code. However, it is applicable
only to QSS with C 6= ∅. Ref. [ZSBHSG02] present a universal quantum
homogenizer, a machine that takes as input a system qubit initially in the
state ρ and a set of N reservoir qubits initially prepared in the identical
state ξ. In the homogenizer the system qubit sequentially interacts with the
reservoir qubits via the partial swap operation. The homogenizer realizes,
in the limit sense, the transformation such that at the output each qubit is
in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the state ξ irrespective of the initial
states of the system and the reservoir qubits. Thus the information contained
in the unknown system state is distributed in the correlations amongst the
system and the reservoir qubits. As the authors point out, this process can
be used as a quantum safe with a classical combination. Now we show how
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this particular feature can be turned into a special case of the (kc, kq, n,C)
threshold scheme, subject to the restriction that Q ⊆ C, so that kq = q, i.e.
all q-players must be present to reconstruct the secret.
The homogenization is reversible and the original state of the system and
the reservoir qubits can be unwound. Perfect unwinding can be performed
only when the system particle is correctly identified from among the N + 1
output qubits, and it and the reservoir qubits interact via the inverse of the
original partial swap operation. Therefore, in order to unwind the homoge-
nized system, the classical information (denotedK) about the sequence of the
qubit interactions is essential. Now, of the (N + 1)! possible orderings, only
one will reverse the original process. The probability to choose the system
qubit correctly is 1/(N + 1). Even when the particle is choosen successfully,
there are still N ! different possibilities in choosing the sequence of interac-
tion with the reservoir qubits. Thus, without the knowledge of the correct
ordering, the probability of successfully unwinding the homogenization trans-
formation is 1/((N + 1)!), which is exponentially small in N [ZSBHSG02].
So for sufficiently large value of N , hardly any information about the system
qubit can be deduced without this classical information.
If K is split up among the q members holding the system and reservoir
qubits according to a (q, q)-CTS, it is easy to observe that this realizes a
(q, q)-QTS not based directly on a quantum error-correction code. In terms
of the generalized definition, this corresponds to a (kc, kq, n,C)-scheme in
which kc = 0, Q = C and n = kq = q. The classical layer of information
sharing is necessary in order to strictly enforce the threshold: if prior ordering
information were openly available, then for example the last q−1 participants
could collude to obtain a state close to ρ. We now present the most general
twin-threshold scheme possible based on homogenization. It will still be
more restricted than that obtained via quantum encryption, requiring that
Q ⊆ C, so that kq = q. If n is not too large, it is preferable for prevention of
partial information leakage to choose the number N of reservoir qubits such
that N ≫ n. The general protocol is executed recursively as follows. Alice
takes N (≫ 1) reservoir qubits, where N + 1 = ∑imi and integers mi ≥ 1
(∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n), and performs the process of homogenization to obtain
states ξ0, ξ1, · · · ξN on the system qubit and the N reservoir qubits.
Scheme 3: Protocol to realize a a restricted (kc, kq, n,C)-Q2TS+C, with
kq = q ≤ n.
Distribution phase: (1) Any mi qubits from N + 1 qubits are given to
the ith member of Q; (2) K is divided into two parts, K1 and K2, according
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to a (2,2)-CTS; (3) Let λc ≡ |Q¯ ∩ C| ≥ 0. K1 is further split among the
members of Q and Q¯ ∩ C using a (q+λc, q+λc)-CTS; (4) K2 is split among
the members of Q¯− C using a (kc − λc, n− q − λc)-CTS.
Reconstruction phase: (1) Collect all q-shares from members of Q; (2)
Collect all |C| c-shares from members of C and reconstruct K1; (3) Collect
any kc − λc shares from members of Q¯− C to reconstruct K2; (4) Using K1
and K2, reconstruct K; (5) Using the q-shares and K, unwind the system
state to restore the secret |S〉.
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Chapter 6
A Step Towards Combining the
Features of QKD and QSS
6.1 Introduction
Regarding the cryptographic use of multipartite entanglement, three broad
issues may be discerned. In the first case, the parties may choose to simply
obtain random bits shared between pairs of the n parties. In the second case,
the entanglement may be used to generate random shared bits between the
n trustful parites. Finally, the n parites may not be entirely trusting and we
may wish to use entanglement to obtain a secret sharing protocol. First case
is essentially QKD between two trustful parties and the later two cases are
respectively n-QKD and QSS on which we have discussed a great deal in the
last two chapters. n-QKD involves sharing a random key amongst n trust-
worthy parties where as QSS splits quantum information amongst untrusted
parties. It would be an interesting extension to consider situations where
some kind of mutual trust may be present between sets of parties while par-
ties being individually mistrustful. This way it could be possible to combine
the essential features of QKD and QSS. In this chapter, we discuss two such
extensions.
Firstly, we consider the problem of secure key distribution between two
trustful groups where the invidual group members may be mistrustful. The
two groups retrieve the secure key string, only if all members should coop-
erate with one another in each group. That is, how the two groups one of
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size k and the other of size n − k may share an identical secret key among
themselves while an evesdropper may co-operate with several(of course not
all) dishonest members from any of the groups. This task is trivially a classi-
cal secret sharing scheme if we involve a trusted third party, say, Lucy. Lucy
will simply generate a random classical bit string. Since it is just a classical
information she makes two copies of it and split one each amongst the two
groups. Principles of quantum physics allows us, as in the case of 2-QKD, to
do away with the third party. Adopting an idea similar to that in Chapter
4, we present a quantum key distribution protocol for this purpose based
on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure by reducing the
problem to the biparitite case using combinatorics developed in Chapter 2.
We can observe that the above problem essentially seems to be a combi-
nation of
1. 2-QKD between the two groups, each group being considered as a single
party and
2. Secret sharing in each group amongst their parties.
In the second possible extension, we consider several such groups. Members
of the same group trust each other whereas members from different groups do
not and the problem is to establish a common shared random key amongst
the n untrustful parties. This problem, as above, could also be tackled by
similar reduction to bipartite case. We discuss a neccessary condition for such
schemes to exist and also present one such scheme. Another step in combining
QKD and QSS could be the generalization of the first case with a setting just
opposite to that in the second case. Members of the same group do not trust
each other whereas members from different groups combined together do
trust the members of other group combined together. The problem is to
establish a common shared random key amongst the different groups.
6.2 Quantum Key Distribution between Two
Groups
In this section we develop a simple protocol for QKD between two groups.
Our protocol works in two broad steps. In the first step, the n-partite problem
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is reduced to a two-party problem by means of SKP-2 (Chapter 2, Protocol-
II). This creates a pure n-partite maximally entangled state among n-parties,
starting from n− 1 EPR pairs shared along a spanning EPR tree using only
O(n) bits of classical communication. The SKP-2 exploits the combinatorial
arrangement of EPR pairs to simplify the task of distributing multipartite
entanglement. In the second step, as in case of n-QKD, the Lo-Chau protocol
[LC99] or Modified Lo-Chau protocol [SP00] is invoked to prove the uncon-
ditional security of sharing nearly perfect EPR pairs between two parties.
To this end, we will be using a state of the form:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉), (6.1)
a maximally entangled n-partite state, represented in the computational ba-
sis.
Our protocol is motivated by a simple mathematical property possessed
by multi-partite states, unlike EPR pairs, which forces them to behave dif-
ferently when measured in computational or diagonal basis. Here below we
develop this mathematics.
Let H ,
⊕
and
⊗
denote the Hadamard gate, the XOR operation and
the tensor product respectively then (assume the presence of a proper nor-
malizing factor in each expression),
H
⊗
n |1〉⊗ n =∑x1,x2,··· ,xn(−1)x1
⊕
x2
⊕···⊕ xn |x1x2 · · ·xn〉
and
H
⊗
n |0〉⊗ n =∑x1,x2,··· ,xn |x1x2 · · ·xn〉
therefore,
H
⊗
n(|1〉⊗ n + |0〉⊗ n) =∑x1⊕ x2⊕···⊕ xn=0 |x1x2 · · ·xn〉
= (
∑
x1
⊕
x2
⊕···⊕ xs=0 |x1x2 · · ·xs〉)(
∑
xs+1
⊕
xs+2
⊕···⊕ xn=0 |xs+1xs+2 · · ·xn〉)
+(
∑
x1
⊕
x2
⊕···⊕ xs=1 |x1x2 · · ·xs〉)(
∑
xs+1
⊕
xs+2
⊕···⊕ xn=1 |xs+1xs+2 · · ·xn〉).
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We can observe by symmetry that the above factoring can be infact done
for any two groups of sizes s and n− s respectively.
We are now ready to develop our protocol which involves the following
steps:
(1) EPR protocol: Along the n − 1 edges of the minimum spanning EPR
tree, EPR pairs are created using Lo-Chau [LC99] or Modified Lo-Chau
protocol [SP00] (by leaving out the final measurement step). This
involves pairwise quantum and classical communication between any
two parties connected by an edge. Successful completion ensures that
each of the two parties across a given edge share a nearly perfect singlet
state 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). At the end of the run, let the minimum number
of EPR pairs distilled along any edge of the minimum spanning EPR
tree be 2m.
(2) The 2m instances of the singlet state are then converted to the triplet
state 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉), by the Pauli operator XZ being applied by the
second party (called Y) on his qubit.
(3) For each edge, the party Y intimates the protocol leader (say “Lucy”)
of the completion of step (2). Lucy is the one who starts and directs
the SKP protocol (Chapter 2, Protocol-II) used below. Note that Lucy
can be from any of the two groups.
(4) SKP protocol: Using purely local operations and classical communica-
tion (LOCC), the n parties execute the SKP protocol, which consumes
the n− 1 EPR pairs to produce one instance of the state (6.1) shared
amongst them.
(5) A projective measurement in the diagonal basis is performed by all the
parties on their respective qubits.
(6) Lucy decides randomly a set of m bits to be used as check bits, and
announces their positions.
(7) All parties from a group assist(coperate) to get one cbit corresponding to
each check bit position by XORing their corresponding check bits. This
gives an effective check bit corresponding to each ckeck bit position.
The two group then announce the value of their effective check bits. If
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too few of these values agree, they abort the protocol. We can note from
the mathematics developed above that the effective check bits should
agree after the diagonal basis measurement. Effective non-check bits
are also calculated as above by XORing the non-check bits of the goup
members.
(8) Error correction is done as in for quantum key distribution between two
trustful parites.
Proof of unconditional security: The proof of unconditional security of
the above protocol is almost the same as for n-QKD (Chapter 4). However,
we would like to stress the role of fault tolerant quantum computation and
of quantum error correcting codes during the execution of SKP protocol for
the following reason: Suppose the probability of error on a bit is p. Then
the probability of an error on the bit obtained by XORing all the s group
members’ bits may be larger, given by:
P =
∑
r=1,3,5...C(s, r)p
r(1−p)s−r, where C(s, r) is the number of all possible
way selecting r elements from a set of s distinct elements.
If P is too close to 0.5, then the effective channel capacity Ch for the
protocol (given by Ch = 1 − H(P ), where H(.) is Shannon entropy) will
almost vanish. Therefore, the quantum part of the protocol implementation
should be very good to ensure that P is not too close to 0.5.
Of the XORed 2m raw bits, m bits are first used for getting an estimate of
P , by obtaining the Hamming distance δ between each group’s m-bit check
string. If they are mutually too distant, the protocol run is aborted. If δ
is not too great (that is 2δ + 1 <= d), it can be corrected with a classical
code C(m, k, d), where m is block length, d is (minimum) code distance and
k/m is code rate. Each group decodes its XOR-ed m-bit string to the nearest
codeword in C(m, k, d). This k-bit string is guaranteed with high probability
to be identical between the two groups. An binary enumeration of the 2k
codewords of C(m, k, d) can be used as the actual key shared between the
two groups.
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6.3 n-QKD amongst Untrustful Parties
We now consider the second case where there are trustful groups but different
set of these groups may not trust each other. For example, suppose there
are 10 parties {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. {1, 2, 3} trust each other but any
of {1, 2} do not trust any of the parties {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. {3, 4, 6, 7} trust
each other but 6 does not trust any other party. {4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10} trust each
other but any of {5, 8, 9, 10} do not trust any of {1, 2, 3, 6}. We mean to say
that there can be several trustful groups and they may have some common
parties. Within a group every one trust each other but a party does not trust
another party who is not in any group he belongs. In the above example the
trustful groups are {1, 2, 3},{3, 4, 6, 7} and {4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10}. Our aim in this
case will be to obtain an unconditionally secure QKD scheme amongst the
n-parties.
Using our n-QKD scheme for trustful parties presented in Chapter 4 and
hypergraph combinatorics developed in Chapter 2 the above problem, along
with necessary and sufficient conditions, can be easily tackled as follows:
Let S denotes the set of parties. Then the trustful groups can be repre-
sented as subsets of S. Now let these groups are E1, E2, · · · , and Em and F
is collection of these subsets. This structure can be represented by a hyper-
graph H = (S, F ) and we call it a security hypergraph of the n parites. This
representation is inline with that of entangled hypergraph in Chapter 2. The
necessary and sufficient condition is same as dictated by Theorem 5, that is,
the QKD between the n parties can be successfully done if and only if the
security hypergraph is connected.
The protocol is to first reduce the security hypergraph to a simple security
graph (Chapter 4) and then to apply a slight modification of the scheme for
trustful n-QKD. In the reduced simple security graph only those vertices
will survive which belongs to at least two hyperedges (that is, two trustful
groups) and edges will be between those vertices that trust each other.
102
Chapter 7
Open Research Directions
We conclude brifly with some open questions based on our research.
1. Lower bound on classical communication complexity for preparing multi-
partite entanglement from bi-partite entanglement under LOCC.
In Chapter 2, we observed that, all the schemes for creating a pure n-
partite maximally entangled state from the distributed network of EPR
pairs amongst n agents, require O(n) cbits of communication. An obvi-
ous open problem is to determine whether there is an Ω(n) lower bound
on the cbit communication complexity for preparing a pure n-partite
maximally entangled state given a spanning EPR tree of n agents. We
hope that critaria using quantum information theory may help settle
this issue.
2. Partial secret sharing
Our Protocol-I in Chapter 2 was motivated by the dynamic and sym-
metric involvement of all the players in the preparation of GHZ state
from two EPR pairs. We pointed out there that it should be interesting
to investigate the ramifications of the protocol. One possible approach
in this direction could be a secret sharing scheme with relaxed condi-
tions as discussed below.
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In usual secret sharing schemes we have mainly two constraints as spec-
ified in their definition:
1. Any authorized set will have the complete information about the
secret.
2. Any unauthorized set will have no information about the secret,
that is, any unauthorized set is maximally uncertain about the secret.
Now let us relax the second constraint. Let the unauthorized sets have
partial information about the secret but not the complete information,
that is, they may not be maximally uncertain about the secret though
they may have partial knowledge of the secret. How much information
an unauthorized set should have could be specified as a part of the spec-
ification of the scheme and could be better given in terms of Shannon’s
or Von-Neumann entropy respectively for classical and quantum case.
For example, one way to relax the threshold scheme (k, n) may be as
follows: The ignorance about the secret wich any m members will have
is given by Shannon entropy H(m) = 0 for m ≥ k and (k −m)/k for
m < k. We could call such schemes to be partial secret sharing schemes
(PSS). There may be some practical applications of such schemes espe-
cially in the quantum case for say multi-party secure computation. For
example, let there are two players B and C. The dealer A wants that
B and C should be able to do full proof computation only when both
of B and C co-operate. She also wants to allow a computation by B up
to a phase factor and that by C up to a bit-flip factor. Such a scheme
may be obtained by relaxing a ((2, 2)) QTS. This is where we might
use the above mentioned symmetric teleportation circuit of Chapter
2 (Protocol-I). Such schemes may also be important in the situation
wherein some members die (in computer network language these are
called faulty nodes), we have partial information and can do reliable
(probabilistic) computation. It should also be interesting to investigate
the compression and inflation of partial secret sharing schemes and to
investigate how the relaxation constraint relates with such compression
and inflation.
Quantitatively, for PSS, one would have to show that the weakening
does not compromise the SS itself. This means that we have to obtain
a lower bound on the number of dishonest colluders (who can sabotage
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the protocol for the remaining players) as a function of the weakening
(quantified using some parameter). One could then say that the pro-
tocol is Y -level secure at X-degree weakness, or suchlike.
Another approach to implement PSS could be like our QSS scheme
(Chapter 5) based on method of information dilution via homogeniza-
tion, where we had to scramble the ordering information in order to pre-
vent partial information gain. Not scrambling this information would
appear to allow partial information reconstruction in a way that seems
compatible with PSS. Therefore, perhaps this method affords a possible
approach to PSS.
3. Distributed quantum error correction and multi-party problems based
on secure execution of SKP protocol
In Chapter 6, the protocol for 2-group QKD utilized SKP protocol as
a subroutine. If we have fault tolerant quantum computers, then from
the security proof of the protocol (similar as for n-QKD in Chapter 4),
it can be noted that a pure n-partite maximally entangled state could
be securely prepared. Given the slow pace in practical realization of
quantum computers than that of quantum communication systems, it
would be very pragmatic to do away with the requirement of the fault
tolerant quantum computers in the secure execution of SKP protocol.
An interesting way of doing this may be to do quantum error correc-
tion in a distributed manner while determining syndromes using local
measurements. In the bipartite case, this has been acheived by Modi-
fied Low-Chou protocol. In the case of multi-partite states, however it
seems to be a subtle task to acheive and remains an unresolved problem
for future research.
Nevertheless, we could also get a simpler protocol for n-QKD which
did not use SKP protocol at all, though it enjoyed the spanning tree
combinatorics. Therefore, it should also be interesting to investigate
the class of secure multi-party computational and cryptographic prob-
lems which can be or can not be executed without secure execution of
SKP.
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4. Combining the features of QKD and QSS
Chapter 6 takes the first step towards expoliting the essential features
of QKD and QSS together, however, we have only dealt with two cases,
namely, 2-group QKD and QKD amongst untrustful parties. It remains
to obtain more interesting situations, such as a simple generalization
of 2-group QKD to n-group QKD, which could essentially combine the
features of QKD and QSS.
5. Generalizing the concept of bicolored merging
In Chapter 3, we have developed the idea of bicolored merging and
utilized it to show various results on the possible or impossible state
transformations of the multi-partite states represented by EPR graphs
and entangled hypergraphs by utilizing only the monotonicity postulate
for appropriate entanglement measures. However, we would also like
to stress that any kind of reduction, which leads to the violation of any
of the properties of a potential entanglement measure, is pertinent to
show the impossibility of many multi-partite state transformations un-
der LOCC. Since the bipartite case has been extensively studied, such
reductions can potentially provide many ideas about multi-partite case
by just exploiting the results from bipartite case. In particular, the
definitions of EPR graphs and entangled hypergraphs could also be
suitably extended to capture more types of multi-partite pure states
and even mixed states and a generalization of the idea of bicolored
merging as a suitable reduction for this case could also be worked out.
It would be interesting to investigate such issues. For example, one
possible variation of bicolored merging could be to relax the third con-
straint, that is the constraint on the number of EPR pairs in the BCM
EPR graphs. One could relax this condition such that the BCM EPR
graphs need only to be distinct and use entropic criterion (restrictions
directly put only by monotonicity postulate may not help here) to show
possibility or impossibility of various state transfomations.
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